Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold by Herald, Marybeth
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 22
Number 3 Spring 1995 Article 3
1-1-1995
Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United
States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased
and Sold
Marybeth Herald
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold, 22
Hastings Const. L.Q. 707 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol22/iss3/3
Does the Constitution Follow the Flag Into
United States Territories or Can It Be




I. The Constitution and the Territories: A Brief History .. 713
A. The Supreme Court and the Territories ............. 713
B. Federal Appellate Court Interpretation of the
Insular Cases ........................................ 719
1. Jury Trials and War Claims-The D.C. Circuit
Expands Constitutional Protections ............. 719
2. The Ninth Circuit Narrows Constitutional
Protections ...................................... 721
II. Further Separating Constitutional Protections from the
Flag-Wabol v. Villacrusis .............................. 722
III. Criticism of Wabol ...................................... 725
A. The Problem of Precedent .......................... 725
B. Misapplication of an Incorrect Test-Reclassifying
Fundamental Rights ................................ 730
C. Other Possible Paths to the Same Result ........... 733
1. Affirmative Action Theory ..................... 733
2. The Native American Analogy ................. 734
3. The NMI Status Argument: The NMI Is Not a
State Under the Fourteenth Amendment ....... 738
IV. Reliance on the Wrong Policy .......................... 741
A. Covenant Section 805: Preserving the Cultural
Base? ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  742
1. The Goal-Protection of NMI Culture ......... 742
2. Unimpressive Implementation .................. 744
* Associate Dean and Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law;, J.D.
Harvard Law School, 1980. The author lived and practiced law in the Northern Mariana
Islands from 1982 to 1991 and was counsel on appeal in Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 675 (1992).
[707]
708 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:707
a. Land as the Proxy for a Complicated
Problem-Race as the Easiest Answer ..... 744
b. The Problem Is Outside Pressure; the
Solution Is a Restriction Designed with the
Help of Outside Pressure? .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  748
c. Majority Enforcement of a Racial
Restriction Against a Minority ............. 749
3. The Results Are Clear .......................... 751
B. Preserving the Consensual Nature of the
Agreement .......................................... 753
1. Working with a Fait Accompli .................. 753
2. Negotiating the United States Constitution ..... 755
a. Constitutional Principles Are Not
Negotiable .................................. 756
b. Get to Yes and Then Claim You Have an
International Obligation .................... 757
c. NMI Inhabitants as a Limiting Force ....... 759
d. The Compromises-Sellable but Not
Necessarily Workable ....................... 763
V. Adopting a Policy That Addresses Real Problems With
Solutions That Are Constitutional ...................... 765
Conclusion ..................................................... 768
Introduction
A question that has long troubled courts and commentators is
how far the United States Constitution should extend beyond the bor-
ders of the states.' At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court
developed the theory that portions of the United States Constitution
were severable.2 Only certain parts automatically applied in United
States territories. Despite criticism of this theory, for the past hun-
dred years the United States flag has flown over a number of territo-
1. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution? 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991);
Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L.
Rav. 587 (1949); Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorpo-
ration, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 823, 823 (1926) ("It is difficult to realize how fervent a contro-
versy raged some twenty-five or more years ago over the question of whether the
Constitution follows the flag.").
2. See generally Coudert, supra note 1; Stanley Laughlin, The Application of the Con-
stitution in United States Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAW. L. Rv.
337 (1980); Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer, The Constitution of the Northern
Mariana Islands: Constitutional Principles and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEO. L.J
1373, 1393-97 (1977).
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ries that are subject to an abridged version of the United States
Constitution.-
In 1992, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision made editing
the Constitution for use in territories easier than ever before by al-
lowing United States and territorial negotiators to modify or delete
specific constitutional protections.4 The only significant limitation is
that the United States and the territorial negotiators must agree on
what constitutional protections apply in the territory. The decision
drastically increases the power of the negotiators to expand United
States sovereignty and conclude permanent political unions at the ex-
pense of individual constitutional rights. More specifically, the deci-
sion allows the United States to impose race-based land alienation
restrictions in its territories outside any equal protection constraints.
The story begins in a series of opinions from decades past that
came to be known as the Insular Cases.' In these cases, the United
States Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether the Con-
stitution travels with the flag into the territories. The answer was not
a clear "yes" or "no," but rather "it depends." What it depends upon
is whether the territory is destined for statehood and whether the con-
stitutional right in question is fundamental.6 For various reasons-
some of which are suspect and subject to criticism-the United States
did not want to be bound by particular constitutional provisions.7 In
1995, the United States and its territories still struggle to define their
legal relationship and obligations.8 Today the territories sometimes
request that the United States keep some Constitutional provisions
out of their back yards.
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (the
"NMI") is the setting for revisiting the legal and policy questions left
dangling in the Insular Cases. The NMI's association with the United
3. As used in this Article, U.S. territories include Guam, the Virgin Islands, Ameri-
can Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands. The 1990 census placed their collective populations at roughly 4 million
although Puerto Rico claims the majority with a population of 3.7. million. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEF+. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION.
4. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 675 (1992).
5. See infra note 27.
6. See Laughlin, supra note 2, at 346; Willens and Siemer, supra note 2, at 1394; JUAN
R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DocrINHE OF SEPARATE
AND UNEQUAL 54-56 (Universidad de Puerto Rico ed., 1985).
7. ARNOLDo LinBOwrrz, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSivE ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 17-26 (1989); Laughlin, supra note 2, at 344-46.
See infra note 175.
8. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
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States came after centuries of control by various foreign powers.
Spain controlled the islands from the sixteenth century until 1898
when Germany took over until after World War I.9 After World War
I, Japan acquired the NMI under a League of Nations mandate.10 In
1947, the NMI became part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
under chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the United Nations Charter."
Under the Trusteeship system, the United States was "placed in a tem-
porary guardian relationship with the trust territories for the purpose
of fostering the well-being and development of the territories into
self-governing states."' 2
In 1976, the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union With the United States of
America was signed into law.'3 The "Covenant" vested sovereignty in
the United States, granted United States citizenship to the NMI's peo-
ple, and contained a variety of provisions outlining the relationship
between the United States and the NMI.' 4
In representing a consensual joining of the NMI under U.S. sov-
ereignty, the Covenant is unique. The Covenant is also unique be-
cause the NMI and United States agreed that critical parts of the
United States Constitution would not apply to the NMI. Three provi-
9. LmBowrrz, supra note 7, at 523-25.
10. Id. at 485-86,525. Naomi Hirayasu, The Process of Self-Determination and Micro-
nesia's Political Status Under International Law, 9. U. HAw. L. REv. 487, 490 (1987); NOR-
MAL MELLER, THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA 10 (1969).
11. See Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18,
1947, U.S.-N. Mar. L, art. 3, 61 Stat. 3301, 3302 [hereinafter 'rusteeship Agreement].
12. Harry G. Prince, The United States, the United Nations, and Micronesia: Questions
of Procedure, Substance, and Faith, 11 MICH. J. IN'rL L. 11, 20 (1989).
13. On November 3, 1986, a formal presidential proclamation terminated the rustee-
ship with the Northern Mariana Islands, conferring United States citizenship on NMI resi-
dents pursuant to § 301 of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America. Proclamation No.
5564, 51 Fed. Reg. 40, 399 (1986). See Holmes v. Director of Revenue and Taxation, Gov-
ernment of Guam, 827 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987).
The United Nations terminated the Trusteeship in December, 1990. S.C. Res. 683,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2972d mtg. at 29 (1990). See Temengil v. Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 881 F2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Thus the Commonwealth is now a part
of the sovereign United States and the Federated States and Marshall Islands are fully
independent, sovereign nations"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990); accord, Gushi Bros.
Co. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1994).
14. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Polit-
ical Union with the United States of America, Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat.
263 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §1681 (1988)) [hereinafter Covenant]; Covenant
§ 101 ("The Northern Mariana Islands upon termination of the Trusteeship Agreement will
become a self-governing commonwealth... in political union with and under the sover-
eignty of the United States of America.").
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sions of the Covenant make the document exceptional in the scheme
of United States constitutional law. First, disregarding the Sixth
Amendment, the local government need not provide a jury trial for
offenses prosecuted by the NMI government. 15 Second, the Covenant
guarantees the NMI a malapportioned legislature despite the equal
protection guarantee of "one person, one vote."' 6 Third, the Cove-
nant provides that the NMI will restrict the alienation of land in the
NMI to persons of NMI descent for the firsf twenty-five years follow-
ing termination of the United Nations Trusteeship. 7
Of these three, the jury trial provision is perhaps the easiest to
address because the authority for an exemption from the procedural
safeguard of a jury trial is rooted in the criticized, but not discredited,
Insular Cases. The malapportioned legislature and racially-based land
restriction provisions, however, are not sanctioned by the Insular
Cases and implicate the substantive principle of equal protection.
Theoretically, only the local government, and not the United
States government, is exempted from these particular constitutional
requirements by the Covenant. The specter is not one of a large and
powerful government deciding which constitutional constraints it is
convenient for it to observe in the territories. Rather, the picture that
is painted is one of a large and powerful government agreeing that
some parts of its constitution may not be in harmony with the condi-
tions and cultures present in the territory and therefore those provi-
sions will not bind the local governments. Specifically, in the case of
the land alienation restriction, the United States was anxious to pro-
tect NMI persons from the economic and cultural changes that would
follow the improvident alienation of their land.'18 They feared that the
people would become the "landless pawns of outside investors" and
wished to prevent subsequent dependence upon United States eco-
nomic aid should that occur.' 9
In reviewing the land alienation restriction, the Ninth Circuit re-
visited the Insular Cases doctrine and revised it in a manner that has
15. Covenant § 501.
16. Covenant § 203(c); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (equal protection
requires that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned by population). For reasons
similar to those discussed in this Article, the NMI's malapportioned legislation is vulnera-
ble to attack. See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) ("We thus
think it is clear that the voting rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected
to the same extent as those of all other citizens of the United States.").
17. Covenant § 805(a).
18. See LEBown-Z, supra note 7, at 591-92; see also Willens and Siemer, supra note 2,
at 1405-1412.
19. Md
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important implications for territories and territorial policy. In Wabol
v. Villacrusis,2 ° the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether equal
protection guarantees limited United States government action in the
NMI.21 The Ninth Circuit held that equal protection guarantees do
not fully bind the United States government in the NMI, or, more
specifically, that the Congress could mandate a race-based land alien-
ation restriction in the NMI without even the minimal constraints of
rational relationship review.' The conclusion is surprising because
the principle of equal protection embodies far more than procedural
rights, and is one of the most basic and fundamental principles guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution. In upholding the NMI's
racial land alienation restriction, the Ninth Circuit expanded the Insu-
lar Cases doctrine under the guise of encouraging territorial self-gov-
ernment, preserving culture, and limiting colonialism. The Wabol
court's endorsement of a broad exemption for the United States Con-
gress from equal protection constraints when dealing with territories
opens the door to future exemptions from other constitutional con-
straints on government action in the territories.
There are three problems with the Ninth Circuit's approach.
First, the Ninth Circuit's analysis is inconsistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent. This vice may be common enough in judi-
cial opinions to make it a mundane criticism, but the importance of
the issue and the depth of disregard for stare decisis sets the case apart
for special study. Part I of this Article provides background treatment
of the application of the Constitution in the territories. The Supreme
Court's, the District of Columbia Circuit's, and the Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretations of that issue will be discussed, with special emphasis on
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Wabol v. Villacrusis.23 Part II outlines
the Wabol decision. Part III of this Article then draws on this back-
ground to discuss why the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wabol misinter-
prets existing case law.
The second problem with the Ninth Circuit's decision is that its
new analytical framework provides an imprecise standard that is likely
to lead to unsound policies and disappointing results. The standard
created by the Ninth Circuit is flawed even from the public policy per-
spectives that appeared to drive the result. In practice, the race-based
land alienation restriction has not protected the NMI's cultural base,
20. 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992).
21. Id. at 1458.
22. Id. at 1462.
23. 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992).
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nor could it be expected to, given its design. Moreover, the principle
that the court establishes is boundless and dangerous because the test
defers to the negotiating parties to decide whether equal protection
guarantees or perhaps any other constitutional restraint should pro-
tect individual rights and bridle governmental action in a territory.
Part IV explores the policy behind the Wabol decision, and demon-
strates why the policy justifications in Wabol are also flawed.
The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Wabol appears, on the
surface, to mitigate social and political problems caused when the
United States brings territories under United States sovereignty. In
reality, however, Wabol is little more than a politically expedient com-
promise that fuels expansionist policies at the expense of individual
rights.
The Ninth Circuit's rule also disregards the value of constitu-
tional principles accorded to all who live under United States sover-
eignty. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit's rule may be used to strip away
individual rights, encourage race and gender discrimination, and
openly adopt such policies without fear of any judicial scrutiny.
The root issue is what principles should govern United States pol-
icy toward the territories. Part V of this Article discusses some consti-
tutional protections given to states and not afforded to territories and
how the Wabol decision contributes to, rather than corrects, these ine-
qualities. This Article concludes that improving United States-territo-
rial relationships lies with solutions less drastic than bargaining away
the Constitution.
I. The Constitution and the Territories: A Brief History
A. The Supreme Court and the Territories
Article IV of the United States Constitution gives Congress the
"power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States."' This provision, known commonly as the Territorial Clause,
appears to give Congress almost unlimited authority to do what it
pleases regarding the territories. Other enumerated powers of Con-
gress, such as the commerce power, are read subject to other constitu-
tional limitations, such as the Bill of Rights. 5 Therefore, when
24. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
25. See, eg., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (Congressional power over District
of Columbia's school system subject to the limitations of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment); see generally John Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the
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Congress acts under any power granted by the Constitution, it should
act consistently with the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has ob-
served: "[T]he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Con-
gress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these
granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not
be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the
Constitution.
' '26
The Supreme Court, however, has not limited congressional
power under the Territorial Clause in this manner. At the turn of the
last century, in a series of six cases known as the Insular Cases,27 the
Supreme Court aided United States expansion by broadly construing
the Territorial Clause. In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court de-
cided that not all constitutional provisions need apply to unincorpo-
rated territories-those territories not destined for statehood.28 The
Supreme Court determined that only fundamental rights constrain
United States government action in unincorporated territories. The
Court stated that fundamental rights are derived from those "princi-
ples which are the basis of all free government which cannot be with
impunity transcended. '29 For example, the Supreme Court decided
that the right to a jury trial is not fundamental,3 0 but that the right to
due process of law is fundamental.
31
Important in this early history was an analysis distinguishing pro-
cedural from fundamental rights. In the leading case, Downes v. Bid-
well,32 Justice White expanded on this distinction. In Downes, the
Court decided that Congress could impose special duties on imports
from Puerto Rico notwithstanding the constitutional requirement that
United States and its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 445 (1992); Laughlin,
supra note 2, at 340-341.
26. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
27. Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 ((1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
28. The concept of incorporation as implying eventual statehood is derived from vari-
ous references in the cases. The Supreme Court has never been very precise about the
definition. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78
CAL. L. REv. 853, 874-75 (1990).
29. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904). The incorporated-unincorporated
distinction was first drawn by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Downes, 182 U.S
at 292, but subsequently adopted by the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142-
43 (1904) (majority) and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-305 (1922) (unanimous
court).
30. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 299.
31. Id.
32. Downes, 182 U.S. at 244.
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"all duties, imposts and excises" be uniform.33 Justice White sug-
gested the following in a concurring opinion:
[T]here may be a distinction between certain natural rights, en-
forced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference
with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights,
which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence. Of the
former class are the right to one's own religious opinion... the
right to personal liberty and individual property;... to due pro-
cess of law and to an equal protection of the laws;... [o]f the
latter class are the rights to... particular methods of procedure
pointed out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence .... 14
In Balzac v. Puerto Rico,35 the Court again distinguished proce-
dural rights from fundamental rights. The Court held that the right to
a jury trial was not fundamental, but stated in dicta that certain funda-
mental rights, such as due process of law, enjoy full application in the
territories.36
Commentators have concluded that the policies that provoked
differentiation between unincorporated and incorporated territories,
and fundamental and non-fundamental rights, were, in part, racist.37
The Insular Cases expressed a fear that if "uncivilized race[s]" were
incorporated into the United States, it might trigger "the immediate
bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely unfit to receive it[.]" 38 The
rule enunciated in the Insular Cases, however, provided flexibility for
governance while "civilization" took place.39
Thus, United States policy, as affirmed in the Insular Cases, re-
flected the view that full application of the United States Constitution
33. U.S. Coisr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
34. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901).
35. 258 U.S. at 309-10.
36. Id. at 312-13.
37. LIEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 22. Of course, the Court often couched its language in
more neutral terms; the cases discuss the fact that the people inhabiting the territories
differed from Americans in "religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of
thought," Downes, 182 U.S. at 287, and had a "different origin and language from those of
our continental people." Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311.
38. Downes, 182 U.S. at 306.
39. James A. Branch, Jr., The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Does a
Different Cultural Setting Justify Different Constitutional Standards?, 9 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'y 35, 43 (1980) ("The rationale for the rule has been that it allows 'semi-civilized'
societies to become civilized before adopting our legal system ... ."); Coudert, supra note 1,
at 827 ("[T]he dominant practical consideration in favor of the plenary power of Congress
was the fear that, if the newly acquired territories were held to be part of the United States,
people of alien race and civilization would become citizens and have the right to claim jury
trials and the other safeguards of personal liberties guaranteed by the first ten Amend-
ments to the Constitution.").
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to the territories was inappropriate for both the United States (which
did not want its citizenship granted to the inhabitants of the territo-
ries) and the inhabitants of its territories (who might have unwanted
requirements, e.g., jury trials, thrust upon them).4 °
Although the Supreme Court has never overruled the Insular
Cases, its decision in Reid v. Covert4l signaled a temporary halt to
their expansion. In Reid, the issue presented was whether a criminal
defendant-a United States citizen on a United States military base in
a foreign country-was entitled to indictment by grand jury and a jury
trial.42 A four justice plurality determined that the defendant was enti-
tled to both constitutional protections.43 Reid criticized the Insular
Cases while suggesting that full constitutional rights should apply, at
least to all United States citizens, when the United States government
was taking action against them:44
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States
acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.45
40. Congress might have hoped for such free ranging authority under its power to
conclude international agreements after the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), suggested that Congress' treaty power could be exercised free of
other constitutional restraints. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34. That decision may be seen as
an attempt by the Supreme Court to extricate itself from the pre-1936 restrictive approach
that the Court had taken to Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. The sugges-
tion never took hold. Reid v. Covert, discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-44,
seemed to put it to rest. Perhaps it became unnecessary to explore that approach after the
Court renounced its restrictive Commerce Clause approach and indeed the Lochner era.
Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally, Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law
Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
41. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
42. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 8-9 ("While [the Insular Cases have] suggested that only those constitutional
rights which are 'fundamental' protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic
or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt
nots' which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment by the Constitution and its Amendments."); accord, Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979) (Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stewart, J.J., concurring).
45. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Harlan concurred in the Reid result,6 but urged the adop-
tion of an "impractical and anomalous" standard to determine
whether constitutional protections should apply to United States gov-
ernment action outside the fifty states.4 7 Harlan cautioned that "there
is no rigid rule that a jury trial must always be provided in the trial of
an American overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial by jury
would be impractical and anomalous." 4 Rather, whether certain pro-
cedural rights were applicable to United States citizens outside the
United States should depend on "the particular local setting, the prac-
tical necessities, and the possible alternatives .... , Justice Harlan
proposed a balancing test so that the Court would be able to avoid a
"rigid and abstract" rule that would apply all constitutional guarantees
to Americans overseas. 50
Justice Harlan relied on Balzac v. Porto Rico,51 one of the Insular
Cases, as authority for his test.52 In Balzac, the Court refused to ex-
tend application of the procedural right to a jury trial to Puerto
Rico.53 It reaffirmed, however, that the basic rights of life, liberty,
property, and due process "had from the beginning full application in
the Philippines and Porto Rico. .. ."54 Justice Harlan assumed due
process applied and was balancing what process was due rather than
asking whether the fundamental right of due process should attach in
the territory.55
More recently, the Supreme Court considered the Insular Cases
in Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero.56 In this case,
Puerto Rico enacted a law allowing only United States citizens to
practice privately as engineers.57 The Supreme Court examined the
46. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid established a test that would gain a future
following. See infra Section I, Part B.
47. Reid, 354 U.S. at 65.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id. A fifth justice later joined in rejecting the Harlan-Frankfurter approach. See
Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (Reid applies to dependents of mili-
tary accused of crimes). At least one current justice, however, seems to favor Harlan's
approach. See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
50. Critics might contend that such an ad hoc approach is a vice precisely because it
contains no standards, and is subject to the value judgments of individual judges.
51. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
52. Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309-310.
54. Id. at 312-13.
55. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75.
56. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
57. Id. at 575.
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Insular Cases and held that equal protection was a fundamental right
applicable to the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico.58 Its discus-
sion was not ambiguous: "It is clear now, however, that the protec-
tions accorded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment apply to residents of Puerto Rico."59 After determining
that the Equal Protection Clause was fundamental, the Supreme
Court examined the alienage restriction under traditional equal pro-
tection analysis and held that it did not withstand strict scrutiny.60
Surprisingly, however, Examining Board of Engineers did not in-
dicate whether it was the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment that
invalidated Puerto Rico's law. This ambiguity, criticized by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in his dissent,61 left many critical questions unan-
swered. If the Court invalidated the law on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment, then the United States government might be responsible
for all actions of the territorial government-a conclusion that would
raise serious concerns about the appearance of colonialism and the
limits of self-government for the territories. 62 Moreover, if the United
States government was responsible for all actions of the territorial
government, then the Court should have applied the rational relation-
ship test. The rational relationship test would have been applicable
because the category under consideration was alienage, a category in
which the federal government has had broad authority to make classi-
58. Id. at 600. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to address the question
whether it was the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment that required the result. Id. at 601.
The Supreme Court has held the Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are co-extensive. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-
08 (1995).
59. Examining Board of Engineers, 426 U.S. at 600.
60. See also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (citations
omitted) ("It is not disputed that the fundamental protections of the United States Consti-
tution extend to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.... In particular, we have held that Puerto
Rico is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws."); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n.5 (1974) (pro-
tection against government taking of property without just compensation is a fundamental
right applicable in Puerto Rico) (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377,382 (1st Cir. 1953)).
61. See Examining Board of Engineers, 426 U.S. at 606-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Cf. Lawson, supra note 28. Lawson argues that all territorial government officials
are officers of the United States and must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Both Guam and the NMI have elected their own officials, both
governor and legislators, and appoint their own local judicial officers. As the commentator
himself admits, arguing that all actions of the territorial governments are actions of the
United States as a constitutional matter, and thus locally elected leaders violate the Ap-
pointments Clause, is not a politically popular suggestion. Id. at 899-911.
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fications under the Equal Protection Clause.63 Additionally, if the
Fifth Amendment was applicable, the Court would have needed to
incorporate its assumption that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause contains an "equal protection component" because there is no
explicit Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment.64 On the
other hand, if the Court invalidated the Puerto Rican law on the basis
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would have needed to ad-
dress how the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the government of
Puerto Rico, which is not a state.65
Although the Supreme Court left some important issues un-
resolved in Examining Board of Engineers, the Court did not waste
paper on the claim that the equal protection of the laws was a non-
fundamental right, inapplicable in an unincorporated territory.
B. Federal Appellate Court Interpretation of the Insular Cases
Justice Harlan's balancing test, although set out in a concurring
opinion, provided a popular test for both the District of Columbia and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals when confronted with interpreting
the Insular Cases.
1. Jury Trials and War Claims-The D.C. Circuit Expands
Constitutional Protections
The D.C. Circuit was called upon to apply the Constitution to
territories in King v. Morton.66 In this case, as in Reid and Balzac, the
procedural right to a jury trial was at issue.67 A non-Samoan United
States citizen, who faced prosecution by the American Samoan gov-
ernment for tax code violations, asserted that he had a right to a jury
trial.68 The court in King held that neither the procedural right to a
jury trial nor an exemption from that right would be automatically
granted.69 Rather, the court held that the United States government
63. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
64. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth
Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 541 (1977).
65. See Examining Board of Engineers, 426 U.S. at 607 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 1146.
68. Id. at 1142. American Samoa was acquired by the United States through an Inter-
national Accord and a United States Proclamation. The United States, Germany, and
Great Britain met to discuss the Samoan group of islands and, ultimately the United States
exercised sovereignty over them. Samoan Convention Agreement, 31 Stat. 1878 (1899);
Exec. Order 125-A (Feb. 19, 1900); Joint Resolution of Feb. 20, 1929, 45 Stat 1253, codified
at 48 U.S.C.A. § 1661 (c) (West 1994).
69. King, 520 F.2d at 1147.
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must show that the guarantee of such a right in American Samoa, an
unincorporated territory, would be impractical and anomalous.7 ° The
D.C. Circuit court remanded the case for consideration of whether the
right to jury trial would be impractical and anomalous.71 To guide this
inquiry, the D.C. Circuit focused on whether American Samoan cul-
ture and society could accommodate the jury system, not whether that
system might disrupt American Samoan culture and society.72 In
other words, the emphasis was not on keeping the culture of the terri-
tory intact, but on keeping the United States Constitution intact and
applicable in the territory.
In King, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit applied the impractical and anomalous test to expand application
of the United States Constitution to a territory.7' The court did not
simply cite Balzac as precedent for the proposition that the proce-
dural right of a jury trial need not be guaranteed in an unincorporated
territory. Rather, it adopted the concurrence of Justice Harlan in Reid
as the starting point. The District of Columbia Circuit used Justice
Harlan's test to expand the list of rights that might be held inapplica-
ble in an unincorporated territory. The decision in King takes a nar-
row view of the Insular Cases and allows the courts to deny residents
of territories certain constitutional rights if guaranteeing those rights
would be impractical and anomalous. 74 Furthermore, the opinion
mandates that courts look at the circumstances and present conditions
in detail.75 Upon remand, the lower court concluded that, given the
erosion of American Samoan culture by western world encroachment
and the fact that, technically, there were enough jurors and legal per-
sonnel to successfully implement the system, it would not be impracti-
cal and anomalous to accord a jury trial right in American Samoa.76
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1148.
72. Thus the questions remanded were "whether the Samoan mores and matai culture
with its strict societal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a defendant is
tried before his peers[, and] whether a jury in Samoa could fairly determine the facts of a
case... without being unduly influenced by customs and traditions of which the criminal
law takes no notice[.]" Id. at 1147.
73. The impractical and anomalous test was derived from Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Reid. 354 U.S. at 75.
74. King, 520 F.2d at 1147.
75. Id. ("The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a
decision in this case rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural develop-
ment of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on unsubstantiated opin-
ion; it must be based on facts.").
76. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1977) ("The institutions of the present
government of American Samoa reflect not only the democratic tradition, but also the
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At around the same time, in Ralpho v. Bell,77 the D.C. Circuit
also extended the right of due process to the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, even though those inhabitants were
neither living under the sovereignty of the United States nor were
they United States citizens.71 Without much discussion, the court dis-
missed the claim that Congress' powers under the Territorial Clause
enabled it to disregard the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment:
We need not in this case choose among the conflicting interpre-
tations of Congress' Article IV [Territorial Clause] powers, how-
ever, because even under the most restrictive standard it is
settled that 'there cannot exist under the American flag any gov-
ernmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due
process of law ....' Of course, the United States does not hold
the Trust Territory in fee simple, as it were, but rather as a
trustee; yet this is irrelevant to the question. That the United
States is answerable to the United Nations for its treatment of
the Micronesians does not give Congress greater leeway to dis-
regard the fundamental rights and liberties of a people as much
American subjects as those in other American territories. We
thus find the actions of the United States in the Trust Territories
constrained by due process. 79
Thus, when the dust settled, the District of Columbia Circuit had
adopted Justice Harlan's test, but had not approved any deviations
from constitutional protections for residents of the territories.
2. The Ninth Circuit Narrows Constitutional Protections
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that the constitu-
tional guarantee of a jury trial automatically extended to the territo-
ries.80 In Commonwealth v. Atalig, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
apparent adaptability and flexibility of the Samoan society. It has accommodated and as-
similated virtually in toto the American way of life.").
77. 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
78. See Gushi Bros. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We have
never considered the Trust Territory as simply a United States territory or insular posses-
sion."); United States v. Covington, 783 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 479
U.S. 831 (1986); accord, In re Rothstein, 884 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1989); Barusch v.
Calvo, 685 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1982); Holmes v. Director of Revenue and Taxation,
827 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987) (under Trusteeship Agreement, NMI was not a posses-
sion of the United States, but a United Nations Trust administered by the United States);
People of Saipan v. United States Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 95 (9th Cir. 1974) (". . . the
Trust Territory is not a territory or possession, because technically the United States is a
trustee rather than a sovereign"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
79. Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 618-19 (citations omitted).
80. Commonwealth v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244
(1984).
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Insular Cases and the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in King v. Morton to
hold that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in the NMI.8
Although the court cited both Harlan's impractical and anomalous
standard and the King decision, the Ninth Circuit placed little empha-
sis on whether a jury trial would be impractical and anomalous in the
NMI. Ultimately, the court neither remanded the case for a consider-
ation of the circumstances then present in the NMI, nor did it closely
examine the justifications recited in the Covenant. 2
The Ninth Circuit then approached the application of the United
States Constitution to the NMI in a more difficult context-the race-
based land alienation restriction contained in the Covenant between
the NMI and the United States.83
I1. Further Separating Constitutional Protections from the
Flag-Wabol v. Villacrusis
In Wabol v. Villacrusis,84 the Ninth Circuit was presented with an
equal protection challenge to a United States imposed land alienation
restriction that prevented anyone other than a person of Northern
Marianas descent from owning land in the NMI.85 Both lower courts
considering the issue held that the land alienation restriction survived
equal protection scrutiny.86 Both courts applied only the rational rela-
81. Id. at 690.
82. Id.
83. Several district courts also have considered the same issues. For example, in
Thompson v. Kleppe, 424 F.Supp. 1263 (D. Haw. 1976), the court held that United States
citizens living on the military base of Kwajalein in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
were entitled to "the protections afforded them under the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 1268.
United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.D. G.D.R. 1979), involved proceedings in a
Berlin court which was designated an instrumentality of the United States and created
under Article II of the United States Constitution. As the court was created by the execu-
tive branch, the Secretary of State argued that the executive-backed by foreign policy con-
siderations-had the authority to give or deny the defendant whatever constitutional
protections it desired. See HE"ERT 3. STEIN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN 94-100, 108-13 (1984).
Such an approach was rejected by the court which emphatically declared that the United
States authorities could not exercise their governmental powers "in any geographical area
... without regard for their own Constitution." Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 242.
84. 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit issued the original Wabol opinion
in 1990, two years after oral argument. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 898 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1990).
It amended it later that year. See 908 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1990). The final opinion, incorpo-
rating further amendments was issued almost two years later, or four years after oral
argument.
85. Wabol, 958 F.2d 1450.
86. The issue was considered by the local trial court-then the Commonwealth Trial
Court-as well as the Federal District Court for the Northern Marianas Appellate Division
which then had jurisdiction over all appeals from the local trial court. Wabol v. Muna, 2
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tionship test to the classification and assumed that equal protection
principles were fully applicable to United States' action in the NMIY
Such a conclusion avoided any decision of whether the Congress could
exempt itself from the equal protection guarantees of the United
States Constitution when dealing with the inhabitants of a territory.
8
The issue presented in Wabol concerned section 805 of the Cove-
nant, where the NMI and the United States agreed that the NMI
would restrict land alienation to persons of NMI descent.8 9 Section
805 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, and notwithstand-
ing the other provisions of this Covenant, or those provisions of
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States applicable
to the Northern Mariana Islands, the Government of the North-
ern Mariana Islands, in view of the importance of the ownership
of land for the culture and traditions of the people of the North-
ern Mariana Islands, and in order to protect them against ex-
ploitation and to promote their economic advancement and self-
sufficiency: (a) will until twenty five years after the termination
of the Trusteeship Agreement, and may thereafter, regulate the
alienation of permanent and long term interests in real property
so as to restrict the acquisition of such interests to persons of
Northern Mariana Islands descent; and (b) may regulate the ex-
Commw. Rptr. 231 (Commw. Trial Ct. 1985), affjd in part and rev'd in part, 2 Commw.
Rptr. 963 (D. N. Mar. App. Div. 1986).
87. Id.; Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1453, 1462 n.22.
88. Covenant § 501(b) ("The applicability of certain provisions of the Constitution of
the United States to the Northern Mariana Islands will be without prejudice to the validity
of and the power of the Congress of the United States to consent to Section 203 [malappor-
tioned legislature] ... Section 805 and the proviso of Subsection (a) of this Section [dealing
with the right to jury trial in local law cases].").
The Covenant framers had taken this route, hoping to avoid the issue altogether, by
maintaining that the restrictions could pass constitutional scrutiny. See, S. REP. No. 433,
94th Cotig., 1st Sess. 65, 74 (1975) [hereinafter Senate Committee Report] ("This subsec-
tion [501(b)] has been inserted only out of super-abundance of caution. In the discussion
of those provisions it has been pointed out that they are in accord with the Constitution.").
At the time of the Covenant's approval, the Supreme Court had not yet considered
the issue of affirmative action. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (claim in-
volving constitutional challenge to an affirmative action program dismissed on mootness
grounds). The doctrine governing race based classifications that advantage a particular
ethnic group has changed and grown more stringent over the years since the Covenant was
approved in the mid-1970's. Compare Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
One can only surmise that the Ninth Circuit felt that deviating from the lower courts'
rationale was more analytically defensible, that is, that the rational relationship test was
not defensible or that the land alienation restriction could not even pass the rational rela-
tionship test. The lower courts' approach, finding equal protection guarantees applicable,
was more consistent with the framers' intent.
89. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1459.
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tent to which a person may own or hold land which is now pub-
lic land. 0
Wabol involved a lease agreement that violated the NMI's land
alienation restriction because the lessee, a non-NMI descent entity,
took a longer lease than permitted under the NMI constitutional pro-
vision implementing section 805.91 When the lessor sued to void the
lease under Article 12, the lessee attacked the constitutionality of both
Covenant section 805 and Article 12 of the NMI Constitutionf 2
The Ninth Circuit, affirming on a different ground, developed the
theory that the land alienation restriction, which the court acknowl-
edged was a racial classification, 93 was not subject to an equal protec-
tion attack.94 The Covenant's language purported to exempt the land
alienation restriction from equal protection scrutiny, while extending
equal protection guarantees to the NMI in other respects.9' Thus, be-
cause the NMI and United States negotiators chose to exempt this
provision from the reach of equal protection guarantees, this aspect of
equal protection did not apply of its own force to the NMI. The Ninth
Circuit held that the land alienation restriction was not even subject to
the rational basis test-the most minimal scrutiny afforded most legis-
lation under equal protection attack. The Ninth Circuit shielded provi-
sions of the NMI-United States Covenant from any equal protection
scrutiny, holding that "the right of equal access to long-term interests
in Commonwealth real estate [was not] a fundamental one which is
beyond Congress' power to exclude from operation in the territory.196
Furthermore, the court narrowed the definition of fundamental rights
to include only those rights "fundamental in the international sense. '9 7
90. Covenant § 805.
91. The NMI corporation was not considered of Northern Marianas descent because
only 50% (rather than 51%) of its voting stock was owned by persons of NMI descent and
only 33% of its directors (one of three) was determined to be of NMI descent. See N. Mar.
I. Const., art. XII, § 5, amended by NMI CONST. amend. 36 (1985).
92. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1451.
93. Id at 1451, 1455.
94. Id. at 1462 n.22 ("The district court's conclusion that equal protection analysis was
applicable was error.").
95. Covenant § 501 (listing specific constitutional provisions applicable to the NMI
and then stating that "[t]he applicability of certain provisions of the Constitution of the
United States to the Northern Mariana Islands will be without prejudice to the validity of
and the power of the Congress of the United States to consent to § [805]").
96. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
97. Id. The court asserted that "[iln the territorial context, the definition of a basic
and integral freedom must narrow to incorporate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures.
Thus, the asserted constitutional guarantee against discrimination in the acquisition of
long-term interests in land applies only if this guarantee is fundamental in this international
sense." Id. The court provided no citation for this proposition.
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The court then concluded that the right to buy land in the Common-
wealth failed to meet this international standard.98
In citing the King and Atalig cases to support its opinion, the
Ninth Circuit also noted that the application of equal protection guar-
antees in these circumstances would be impractical and anomalous be-
cause it would have a negative impact on the local culture, interfere
with the United States' political arrangement with the NMI, and inter-
fere with the United States' international commitments under the
Trusteeship Agreement. 99 The Ninth Circuit also recited the Cove-
nant's boilerplate justifications for the restriction and concluded that
extending the equal protection guarantee in the context of land alien-
ation would be both impractical and anomalous. 100
IlL. Criticism of Wabol
A. The Problem of Precedent
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wabol is difficult to reconcile with
precedent. The Ninth Circuit's theory does not take into account nor
does it adequately distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Exam-
ining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero.10' In Examining Board
of Engineers, the Supreme Court recognized that equal protection of
the laws was a fundamental right applicable to residents of the unin-
corporated territory of Puerto Rico. 02 Confronted with this ostensi-
ble roadblock, the Ninth Circuit reached its result by recasting equal
98. Id. at 1462.
99. Id. at 1460-62.
100. Id. at 1461-62. The Court cited to the analysis of the NMI Constitution adopted by
the delegates.
101. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
102. Id. A more difficult question is whether the Appointments Clause is a "fundamen-
tal right" applicable to the territories. See Lawson, supra note 28.
A second, more difficult question is whether Article III is applicable to the territorial
courts. See U.S. CONST., Art. III, § 1:
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
The NMI has an Article IV territorial court with a judge appointed by the President,
but with limited tenure. Covenant, art. IV. The Supreme Court has held that the constitu-
tional right to a trial conducted by a judge with the salary and tenure guarantees of Article
III is inapplicable in the territories. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,400 (1973);
Lawson, supra note 28, at 893 (criticizing Palmore). See also Stanley K. Laughlin Jr., The
Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States Territories: The Case of American
Samoa, 13 U. HAw. L. Rnv. 379, 437-51 (1991) (arguing that equal protection principles
dictate inclusion of the territories in the Article III system of courts).
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protection guarantees as protecting various activities deemed worthy
of protection from government racial discrimination, rather than a
broad principle protecting all activities from discrimination. 10 3 In
holding that the racial restriction on the acquisition of property in the
NMI was immunized from any equal protection scrutiny, the Ninth
Circuit posed the critical question: "Is the right of equal access to
long-term interests in Commonwealth real estate, resident in the
equal protection clause, a fundamental one which is beyond Congress'
power to exclude from operation in the territory under Article IV,
section 3?"'1 4 The Ninth Circuit explained that such unusual phrasing
of the issue was necessary because "[ilt is the specific right of equality
that must be considered for purposes of territorial incorporation,
rather than the broad general guarantee of equal protection." 05 Of
course, if the Ninth Circuit had asked, "is the equal protection of the
laws a fundamental right?" the answer would have been "yes" based
on the Examining Board of Engineers decision.
There is little support for the Ninth Circuit's distorted construc-
tion of the issue presented in the Wabol case. Rather, the Ninth Cir-
cuit played a judicial version of the "Jeopardy" game show by
constructing a question that matches the desired answer.1' 6 If the
Supreme Court had followed the Ninth Circuit's approach in Examin-
ing Board of Engineers, they would have asked: "Is the right of equal
access to a private civil engineering practice in Puerto Rico resident in
the equal protection clause a fundamental one?" No doubt the an-
swer would have been "no" because the question removes the offen-
sive nature of the restriction-whether the classification is based on
race or alienage-and emphasizes the importance of the underlying
activity. The Supreme Court, however, has not adopted such a
cramped view of equal protection. Instead, it has stated that, "It]he
guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a
source of substantive rights or liberties, but rather a right to be free
from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other
governmental activity.'
10 7
Thus, the Ninth Circuit shifted the emphasis from invidious dis-
crimination to the specific activity sought to be conducted without
103. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460 n.19; see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
104. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
105. Id.
106. See also Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 420 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("But answers are not obtained by putting the wrong question and
thereby begging the real one.").
107. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).
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race discrimination-the purchase of a long-term interest in Common-
wealth property. The Ninth Circuit's analysis ultimately resulted in
the conclusion that the fundamental right to equal protection was not
implicated because the right to buy land in the NMI is not fundamen-
tal enough to be protected from race discrimination in its exercise. 10 8
If one is left wondering what activities are worth protecting from ra-
cial discrimination in an unincorporated territory, the Ninth Circuit's
answer would be those declared "fundamental in the international
sense."'1 9 Thus, equal protection of the laws was no longer a funda-
mental right; rather, a person is only entitled to equal protection of
the laws where the underlying right that one would like to exercise
without racial discrimination is fundamental in the international sense.
This shift in emphasis is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Examining Board of Engineers and with the underlying
purpose of the equal protection guarantees. Equal protection of the
laws means more than the right to live free from certain kinds of gov-
ernment racial discrimination in some facets of our existence. Equal
protection guarantees that the government will treat all persons
equally, regardless of race, creed, sex, or national origin.1 0 Equal
protection guarantees apply regardless of the arbitrary value assigned
by others to the underlying activity that the individual would like to
conduct without discrimination. For example, there may be no "fun-
damental right" to eat lunch at a particular lunch counter, but that
does not mean that the government may prevent people from being
served on the basis of race."' Similarly, many rights are not deemed
fundamental, such as the right to an education." 2 When the govern-
ment provides a public education, however, both Congress and the
states must provide it without racial discrimination."13
"The Ninth Circuit defended its interpretation in Wabol by citing
Califano v. Torres,"4 a case in which the Supreme Court held that
108. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460-62.
109. lId
110. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (national origin).
111. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151-52 (1970) (white female school
teacher was denied service at a lunch counter and was subsequently arrested because she
was in the company of African American students).
112. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
113. Compare id. (education not a fundamental right) with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools) with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (equal
protection component prohibits Congress from maintaining racially segregated schools in
the District of Columbia).
114. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
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Congress could deny social security benefits to all persons living in
Puerto Rico.115 Califano, however, involved a facially race-neutral
non-suspect geographic restriction, not a suspect classification such as
race.116 The restriction in Califano was applicable to all residents; it
did not deny social security to persons of certain races or ancestries
living in Puerto Rico. In addition, the Supreme Court in Califano ap-
plied equal protection scrutiny, although at the rational relationship
level." 7
The cases the Ninth Circuit discussed do not support its conclu-
sion. In neither King nor Atalig did Congress grant a right in a racially
discriminatory manner. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Atalig-that
the jury trial right in local law cases was non-fundamental"4-was
made in the context that the denial of the "non-fundamental" right
was to every person, regardless of race, creed, or color, including all
United States citizens living in the NMI. In Wabol, however, the sus-
pect classification of race determined the extent of the grant of equal
protection rights. None of the cases specifically considered equal pro-
tection as a right dispensable upon a finding that application of the
principles of equal protection would be "impractical and
anomalous." 119
The court misinterpreted precedent by misplacing the adjective
"fundamental." The Insular Cases asked whether the constitutional
right in question was fundamental. Fundamental described a broad
right, not its narrow application. The importance of working as an
engineer was not the focus in Examining Board of Engineers, nor was
the amount of the war claim in Ralpho, nor the nature of the criminal
charge in Balzac or Atalig or King. Accordingly, the right the parties
wished to exercise without racial discrimination-the purchase of land
in the NMI-should not have been the focus in Wabol. Carried to its
logical conclusion, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning would mean that First
Amendment protections might only be applicable where the conversa-
115. Id. at 5 (describing federal law as a "geographic limitation").
116. Id at 20. Thus it applied to all citizens of all races living in Puerto Rico. One could
argue that this operated in effect as a racial restriction, but it would require a more sophis-
ticated argument involving congressional intent. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977) (where law or regulation is facially neutral but
has a racially disproportionate impact, it will not be subjected to heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause unless motivated, at least in part, by an invidiously discrimina-
tory intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
117. Califano, 435 U.S. at 5.
118. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 688.
119. Id
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tion, newspaper article, or picketing was related to something of fun-
damental importance in the international sense.120
Wabol sanctions a broad power in Congress to extend a wide
range of rights and benefits to United States territories and posses-
sions in a race-based manner. If a court makes the impractical and
anomalous finding, race or gender-based restrictions need not survive
any level of scrutiny to be upheld. Race or gender discrimination
under the United States flag need not support a compelling, impor-
tant, or even a legitimate goal. Nor need the means used be narrowly,
substantially, or rationally tailored to achieve the goal.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Wabol was not consistent with
the spirit of the cases that the court did acknowledge and use to sup-
port its analysis. The court used Justice Harlan's impractical and
anomalous test, not to limit the exemptions from constitutional guar-
antees in unincorporated territories, as in King v. Morton,'12 but to
expand the exemptions of constitutional guarantees applicable in un-
incorporated territories.'2 The Ninth Circuit assumed that Justice
Harlan's test was appropriate, yet made no attempt to follow it. The
impractical and anomalous test required examination of "the particu-
lar circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alterna-
tives which Congress had before it."' 23 The Wabol opinion, recited
the interests ostensibly offered for the restriction without examining
the validity of those interests or whether the interests were currently
relevant.'2 4 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that challenges to the
"precision with which the restrictions operate to further these inter-
ests ... would have substantial force in an equal protection analy-
sis."" s The Ninth Circuit, however, then nonchalantly announced
that "[a] restriction need not be precisely tailored to qualify for ex-
120. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 113 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1993) (the
Supreme Court refused to consider Puerto Rican tradition in deciding whether the First
Amendment required preliminary hearings to be open to the public). Of course, under the
Ninth Circuit's analysis, Puerto Rico need only include this constitutional right on its hit
list at subsequent status negotiations. If negotiators agree that this aspect of the First
Amendment conflicts with tradition, it will be eliminated as a constitutional guarantee in
Puerto Rico.
121. 520 F.2d at 1140. The King court took what the Supreme Court had labelled a
non-fundamental right and turned it into a fundamental right by requiring proof that it
would be impractical and anomalous to apply it in the territory. Id. at 1147.
122. 520 F.2d 1140 (1975).
123. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). In King v. Morton
the D.C. Circuit had remanded the case for full factual development of the record. See
supra note 75.
124. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
125. Id at 1461.
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emption from equal protection scrutiny."' 26 Thus impractical and
anomalous meant somewhat impractical and rather anomalous. In
other words, the Ninth Circuit signalled that it would turn a blind eye
to implementation of race-based restrictions once the exemption was
granted.
B. Misapplication of an Incorrect Test-Reclassifying Fundamental
Rights
In addition to asking the wrong question, the Ninth Circuit's an-
swer to that question was wrong. Not only did the court incorrectly
recast equal protection doctrine, but the application of its revised ver-
sion required some result-oriented lapses in logic.
The Ninth Circuit transformed a fundamental right into a non-
fundamental right by labeling the fundamental right impractical and
anomalous. 127 The Ninth Circuit, however, obscured its action by con-
tinuously repeating its underlying theme that straightforward applica-
tion of constitutional restrictions on actions by the United States
outside the geographic boundaries of the United States reflected an
insular vision of the world.128 The Ninth Circuit reinterpreted the
phrase "fundamental right" to mean that any right that is "fundamen-
tal in the international sense" should automatically apply in an unin-
corporated territory. 29 Yet, having appealed for a world vision, the
Ninth Circuit then defined "fundamental in the international sense" in
the most provincial sense possible. 30 The court deferred to the nego-
tiating parties and did not determine whether the right to own land
was fundamental in the international sense.13' Although packaged as
an international standard, the Ninth Circuit did not inquire what the
international consensus was on the subject. 32 Moreover, the Ninth
126. Id. at 1462.
127. Id.
128. l at 1460 ("In the territorial context, the definition of a basic and integral free-
dom must narrow to incorporate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures. Thus, the asserted
constitutional guarantee against discrimination in the acquisition of long-term interests in
land applies only if this guarantee is fundamental in the international sense.").
129. Id. at 1460.
130. As one commentator noted, the Ninth Circuit decided that the right to own real
property is not fundamental "because the NMI and United States do not mutually consider
this right to be inalienable." Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy:
Applying the Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 779, 789 (1992). Little
attention is paid to what the rest of the international community thinks.
131. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
132. Cf. Neuman, supra note 1, at 980-81 n.420 (the author rejects the suggestion that
equating the fundamental rights of United States citizens abroad with rights under interna-
tional human rights law is an inappropriate standard:
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Circuit asserted that inclusion of different cultures would necessarily
"narrow" the meaning of a "basic and integral freedom.' 1 33
The right of equal access to ownership of property is fundamental
within the United States constitutional system:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was re-
garded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-
condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and
liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee.3
Similarly, the principle of equal access to property regardless of
race or ancestry is an internationally recognized right.135 The Ninth
Circuit did not explore this issue. Rather, in keeping with its broad
global focus, the court bolstered its argument that equal protection
guarantees were inapplicable because the "[t]he Bill of Rights was not
intended to interfere with the performance of our international obli-
As a purely normative matter, this suggestion should lose its appeal once it is
recognized that international human rights standards have not been offered as a
sufficient constitution for all societies, but rather as a uniform minimum standard
of rights that can be agreed upon notwithstanding cultural diversity. A citizen of
the United States may appropriately expect more from her government than the
international minimum standard.).
133. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
134. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1948). See also, Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972) (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 10); 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1988) ("All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property.").
135. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 5 ("States parties under-
take to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: ... (d) ... (v) The
right to own property alone as well as in association with others; . . .") (signed but not
ratified by the United States); U.N. CHARTER art. 76. ("The basic objectives of the trustee-
ship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1
of the present Charter shall be: ... (c) to encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and
to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the people of the world."); U.N. CHAR-
rER art. 1, 1 3 (purposes of United Nations include "encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race."); Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) reprinted in [1948-49] 3 V.B. 535 (United States not a signatory party) ("Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status."); ID. at art. 7 ("All are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."); ID. at art. 17
("Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.").
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gations.' '1 36 Exactly the opposite is legally true-whether Congress
acts domestically or internationally, it must act within the bounds of
the Constitution. 37
The Ninth Circuit's allusion that Covenant section 805 did not
violate the Trusteeship Agreement is also misleading. Specifically, the
Trusteeship Agreement gave the United States original governing au-
thority over the NMI and provided that the "administering authority
shall... protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements
of the population without discrimination .... ,38 In Wabol, the court
declined to consider the argument that the Trusteeship Agreement
had been breached by the enactment of Covenant Section 805.'39 In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit blithely asserted that the Trusteeship Agree-
ment required Covenant section 805, a disputed proposition that the
Court earlier declined to resolve.140
136. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
137. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,324 (1988) ("[N]o agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution.") (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957));
Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087
(1989); In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484-85 (7th Cir. 1984). See also REsTATEME-NT CTmRD)
oF FOREiGN RELATIONS LAW § 721 (1987) ("The provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion safeguarding individual rights generally control the United States government in the
conduct of its foreign relations as well as in domestic matters, and generally limit govern-
mental authority whether it is exercised in the United States or abroad, and whether such
authority is exercised unilaterally or by international agreement.").
138. Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 11.
139. The defendants in Wabol actually argued before the Ninth Circuit that:
The trust relationship, rather than sanctioning a discriminatory land alienation
restriction, bolsters the conclusion that the United States had no authority to limit
the right to acquire property to a certain segment of the population based on
ancestry. Although the United States has the duty to "protect the inhabitants
against the loss of their land and resources," it must be read in conjunction with
the mandate [of the Trusteeship Agreement] not to discriminate among any ele-
ments of the population.
Philippine Goods, Opening Brief at 19-20 (quoting art. 6, § 2 of the Trusteeship
Agreement).
140. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461. The Ninth Circuit refused to consider whether Covenant
§ 805 violated the Trusteeship Agreement, saying that it had not been raised by the parties.
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1458 n.15. It was. The court's dodging of this issue is also disingenuous
because it chose-without further briefing-to rest its decision on a basis wholly different
from that of the lower courts. The court rested its new theory in part on its interpretation
of the very article of the Trusteeship Agreement relied upon by the appellants in Wabol to
argue that the United States had no authority under the Trusteeship Agreement to agree to
§ 805. See Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461 ("And we must be mindful also that the preservation of
local culture and land is more than mere desideratum-it is a solemn and binding under-
taking memorialized in the Trusteeship Agreement.").
Note that in design, Covenant § 805 requires the NMI to disenfranchise from land
ownership persons of other Micronesian ancestries, e.g., Palauan or Yapese, although the
United States was under the same Trusteeship obligation to these persons. A number of
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C. Other Possible Paths to the Same Result
The United States' primary defense of Covenant section 805 was
not that the United States government could exempt its action from
the constraints of equal protection guarantees. Rather, the legislative
history shows that negotiators thought the provision would pass equal
protection scrutiny.14 1 United States negotiators discussed two ap-
proaches to reach this result: (1) early affirmative action cases; and
(2) a Native American analogy. The usefulness of the first approach
has eroded as the Supreme Court has increased the level of scrutiny
applied to affirmative action legislation. Although the second ap-
proach might produce the desired result, it is not legally or logically
defensible.
1. Affirmative Action Theory
Affirmative action theory was in its embryonic stages when Cove-
nant section 805 was initially considered. 42 Since that time, the
Supreme Court has increased the level of scrutiny for race-based af-
firmative action programs-a result the negotiators may not have an-
ticipated. 143 It now appears that strict scrutiny would apply to
Micronesians reside in the NMI -approximately 3500 of the 43,345 people living in the
NMI. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION
AND HOUSING: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, COMMONWEALTH
OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, 1990 CPH-6 16 (March 1992).
141. See Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 74.
142. The Supreme Court's decision in Examining Board of Engineers, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) was not issued until 1976, after the Covenant had been negotiated and finalized. Its
rather curt application of the Equal Protection Clause to Puerto Rico must have been a
shock to the negotiators.
143. The Senate Committee Report cited Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 177 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (summarily upholding
federal affirmative action plan against equal protection challenge because the "Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit such action."). The Senate Committee Report claimed that
this case held "that differentiations and even quotas designed to remedy past evils are not
inconsistent with the equal protection aspects of the Fifth Amendment [and the] same
considerations would apply to measures designed to avoid future wrongs." Senate Com-
mittee Report, supra note 88, at 87-88.
The legislative history also shows reliance on the Hawaiian Homes Act passed in 1921.
See Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 88. This measure, applying only to a finite
amount of public land in Hawaii, was much more limited in scope than § 805, but perhaps
as much a failure:
This measure ostensibly guaranteed special homestead leases on pockets of land
throughout the island for those claiming 50 percent or more Hawaiian blood....
However, relatively few native families benefitted from the act, and at the time of
statehood only 10 percent of the land originally set aside was being used by Ha-
waiian or part-Hawaiian families, while about 20 percent was unusable, and the
remainder was leased to ranches or plantations.
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Covenant section 805.144 For reasons discussed in Part IV of this Arti-
cle, Covenant section 805 most likely would not pass this level of re-
view. 45 The NMI and the United States have shown a lack of interest
in the goals of the alienation restriction in most other aspects of their
actions, casting doubt on its compelling nature. Moreover, the means
used to achieve the goals are-by design-doomed because they al-
low free alienation among NMI persons and lengthy leases for all
others.
2. The Native American Analogy
In Wabol, the Ninth Circuit might have analogized the relation-
ship between the NMI and the United States to that between Native
Americans and the United States government. The legislative history
makes a shallow attempt to compare the two situations. 46 Although
it is true that federal legislation affecting Native Americans is subject
to rational relationship review under the Equal Protection Clause, the
comparison to the NMI situation is unpersuasive because: (1) Cove-
nant § 805 is based on a racial classification only, not a political plus
racial classification that characterizes legislation involving Native
Americans; (2) the basis for Congress' authority over Indian tribes is
different from Congress' authority over the NMI and does not support
singling out NMI descent persons for special treatment; and (3) there
is no law comparable to the sweeping nature of Covenant § 805 that
has been upheld with respect to Native Americans. Moreover, the
answer should not be found in applying equal protection analysis, but
lowering the level of scrutiny to the rational basis test so that the scru-
tiny is meaningless.
ROGER BELL, LAST AMONG EQUALS: HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD AND AMERICAN POLITICS
46-47 (1984).
144. Even benign race classifications enacted by Congress are subject to strict scru-
tiny-the goal must be compelling and the means narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (federal affirmative action pro-
gram). See also, Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Application of the Constitution in United
States Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAw. L. REv. 337, 385 (1980-81)
(suggesting an intermediate level of scrutiny for racial land alienation restriction in Ameri-
can Samoa).
145. These reasons include its over and under-inclusiveness, and that it does not ad-
dress remedying past discrimination but rather future harm. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). It is possible, of course,
that the Court would find the future protection of land and culture a compelling interest,
but the value of equal protection analysis at the higher level is that it would require speci-
ficity in both the goal and the means.
146. Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 87 ("Similar legislation has been up-
held with respect to American Indians.").
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The United States Supreme Court has applied the rational rela-
tionship test for federal government actions toward Native Ameri-
cans. This level of review is partly premised upon a finding that the
category "Indians" is a political and not a racial category. 47 Thus, the
Supreme Court has held that where the United States government
classifies Native Americans in legislation by "singling out tribal Indi-
ans," such legislation is based on a political and not a racial
classification.148
The Ninth Circuit might have claimed that the classification "per-
sons of Northern Mariana Islands descent,"'1 49 was a political, not a
racial category, even though it relied on blood quantum as part of its
description. 50 The problem with the analogy is that the target of
comparison is based on a flawed argument. Classifications involving
Native-Americans contain both racial (Indian) and political (tribal af-
filiation) components where the legislation refers to certain tribes.' 5'
The classification, however, is at least partially racial and the decisions
choose to ignore the racial and focus on the political. That a classifica-
tion has two components, one racial and another not, does not erase
the racial nature of the restriction. The racial component is a neces-
sary criteria. This legal fiction has been criticized as convenient but
not logical and should not be extended further.'52
Moreover, the definition of "persons of Northern Marianas de-
scent" does not even contain a political component that can provide
minimal cover for the race-based component. There are no non-sus-
pect criteria, such as political affiliation, or even residency, which
counterbalance the suspect race classification in the Northern Mari-
147. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (to qualify for employment pref-
erence with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, person needed to be a member of a federally
recognized tribe and be one-fourth or more Indian blood).
148. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 500-01 (1979).
149. Covenant § 805(a).
150. See Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d
1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1982). But see David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 796-98 (1991) (criticizing Alaska
Chapter decision).
151. See Williams, supra note 150, at 786-810.
152. ld.; LIEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 435 ("[T]he general approach is troubling... To
build upon this precedent outside the Indian context would appear to promote racial dis-
crimination in the legal system. Further, it appears inappropriate to bring to bear upon the
'Territories' the special character of the Indian reservations. Many of the key issues in the
federal-territorial relationship (immigration and tariff) and international arena are outside
the doctrinal framework developed for Indian tribes.").
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anas.15 3 In addition, the negotiating history of the Covenant demon-
strates that the parties intended to adopt a classification based on
ancestry.15 4 The Ninth Circuit's recognition that the classification was
racial is the most candid part of its opinion.' 5
Further, part of the Supreme Court's rationale was that the Com-
merce Clause specifically singled out Indian tribes for special treat-
ment by Congress and the special treatment was accorded members of
153. A political rather than a racial basis for the employment preference in Morton v.
Mancari has been defended in part upon the basis that the employment preference applied
to only those "in federally recognized tribes." 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. See generally Christo-
pher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious
Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1263-67 (1994).
154. See Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 89:
Under this section [Covenant-§ 805] the Government of the Northern Mariana
Islands and [sic] until 25 years after the termination of the Trusteeship [will] regu-
late the alienation of permanent and long-term interests in property so as to re-
strict the acquisition of such interests to persons of Northern Mariana Islands
descent, i.e., of Chamorro or Carolinian ancestry.
When the NMI set about enforcing the restriction through Article XII of the NMI
Constitution, they complied with this directive. The legislative history of Article XII
reveals that before 1966 only indigenous Chamorros or Carolinians qualified for Trust Ter-
ritory citizenship and only such persons met the Article XII test. N. MAR. I. CONSr. art.
XII § 4 (Person is a full-blooded NMI Chamorro or Carolinian if "born or domiciled in the
Northern Mariana Islands by 1950 and [a] citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands before the termination of the Trusteeship with respect to the Commonwealth.") Citi-
zens of the Trust Territory were those born in the Trust Territory who did not acquire other
citizenship at birth, or those outside the Trust Territory of Trust Territory citizen parents.
53 T.T.C. § 1. See Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 2 Commw. Rptr. 598,
637 (D. N. MAR. I. 1986) ("Trust Territory citizenship is an administrative classification
designed by the Trust Territory government to identify those persons who claim origin or
ancestry in the islands of Micronesia."), rev'd on other grounds, 881 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990).
Moreover, NMI person status is passed on strictly by the circumstances of birth or
adoption. Thus children may be citizens of any country, and live anywhere, so long as they
descend from "a person of Northern Mariana Islands descent." Yet a person whose par-
ents are not 25% NMI descent, e.g., a person of Palauan descent, will be ineligible to own
land in the NMI, no matter what her citizenship or how long she has lived in the NMI. In
operation, the definition of person of Northern Marianas descent is based on race and/or
ancestry.
Although the definition of Northern Marianas descent eventually adopted by the NMI
had United States citizenship or eventual United States citizenship as a requirement, not
all persons living in the NMI who were eligible under the Covenant to become United
States citizens qualified to be of Northern Marianas descent. Thus many persons with ties
to the NMI-longstanding enough to be eligible for United States citizenship-did not
qualify for land ownership privileges under the land alienation restriction. See, e.g., Pange-
linan v. Castro, 688 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that agency was bound by deter-
mination that plaintiffs met citizenship requirements).
155. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1451, 1455.
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federally recognized tribes.'5 6 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found
that Congress acted in accordance with the Territorial Clause in enact-
ing section 805.157 The Territorial Clause does not single out any par-
ticular people, nor people in general.
Finally, no legislation passed by Congress regarding Native
Americans approaches the sweep of Covenant Section 805. Congress
granted preferential tax status, hiring policies, and fishing rights to
Native Americans. 158 Even when Congress enacted restrictions on
Native American land, it did so on a theory that the property is either
in plenary control of the United States government, or is public or
trust land held for the benefit of Native Americans.159 Federal legisla-
tion did restrict the sale of Native American land to any person with-
out the approval of the federal government. United States ownership
of the land as trustee, however, is the basis for this legislation.160 Ac-
cordingly, the United States holds fee simple title to the land upon
which it places restrictions, and the right of occupancy of Native
Americans is tribal, not individual. 61 In contrast, the United States
has never claimed ownership of privately held land in the NMI. Fur-
thermore, the right to privately own lands in the NMI is individually
based, not group based. For these reasons, the analogy to case law
involving Native Americans does not apply in the case of Covenant
section 805.
If applicable, however, it would subject the restriction to some
level of equal protection scrutiny. In the Native American context,
there must be a rational relationship between the special treatment
and the government's unique obligation to the Native Americans. 6
156. See supra note 147; U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power to ...
regulate Commerce with.., the Indian tribes.").
157. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States . . . .") A separate problem with the court's opinion is that when
Congress approved the Covenant, the NMI, as part of the U.N. Trusteeship, was not a
territory or possession of the United States. See Gushi Bros. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d
1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We have never considered the Trust Territory as simply a
United States territory or insular possession.").
158. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,714 (1943) (tax exemption);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (hiring preference).
159. Seber, 318 U.S. 705; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 n.1 (1939).
160. See United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 79 (1915).
161. Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73,86 (1977) (stating that
the authority to control tribal property is "one of the most fundamental expressions, if not
the major expression, of the constitutional power of Congress over Indian affairs") (quot-
ing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDLAN LAWS 94, 97 (1942)).
162. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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In the NMI context, rational relationship scrutiny would be based on
the fiction that the restriction was not racial. There would be the ap-
pearance of observing equal protection restraints generally, but the
artificially low level of scrutiny would make the protection worthless.
3. The NMI Status Argument: The NMI Is Not a State Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Another argument that the Ninth Circuit might have used was
that equal protection guarantees do not bind the NMI government.
The theory is that the NMI is neither an incorporated nor an incorpo-
rated territory under the Insular Cases, but is an entity sui generis pos-
sessing characteristics of both states and territories. 163 The NMI,
therefore, in consenting to join the United States, held a greater status
than that held by territories considered in the Insular Cases. Accord-
ing to this theory, the NMI could choose whether to bind itself to the
same constitutional restrictions that bind the fifty states because it is
not a state.164 For example, the United States Supreme Court,
although labeling Puerto Rico's commonwealth status unique, has
never indicated that such uniqueness might imply more leverage than
territorial status or fewer constitutional constraints than state
status. 65
It is uncertain whether the actions of the NMI government, ab-
sent agreement in the Covenant to be bound by such constitutional
restrictions, would be constrained by these constitutional restrictions
if it were not "a state." Justice Rehnquist made this observation in his
163. This argument was made but not decided in the Atalig case:
The NMI argues that its political status is distinct from that of unincorporated
territories such as Puerto Rico. This argument is credible. Under the
[T]rusteeship [A]greement, the United States does not possess sovereignty over
the NMI. As a commonwealth, the NMI will enjoy a right to self-government
guaranteed by the mutual consent provisions of the Covenant....
Thus, there is merit to the argument that the NMI is different from areas
previously treated as unincorporated territories. We need not decide this issue
because the independent force of the Constitution is certainly no greater in the
NMI than in an unincorporated territory.
Atalig, 723 F.2d at 691 n.28. But see Barusch v. Calvo, 685 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1982)
("When all portions of the Covenant become effective, the Northern Marianas will have a
political status comparable to other United States territories.").
164. Territories have no independent sovereignty. See Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U.S. 308, 317 (1937). States theoretically have sovereignty reserved under the
Tenth Amendment, but it is more theoretical than real. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985). But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
165. Examining Board of Engineers, 426 U.S. at 596 (Puerto Rico "occupies a relation-
ship to the United States that has no parallel in our history.").
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dissent in Examining Board of Engineers.166 He indicated that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
might not bind the actions of the government of Puerto Rico absent
agreement or congressional imposition because the Fourteenth
Amendment uses the explicit language, "No state ....,167
Even if the NMI is not analogous to a state, all actions of territo-
rial governments may be considered attributable to the United
States.168 This argument might support the theory that the Fifth
Amendment is the source of the limitation on government power. 6 9
Regardless of its validity, the argument that the NMI-as a non-
state or non-territory-is constitutionally constrained only so far as it
agrees to be, is not implicated in this case.. 70 This argument assumes
the United States was silent in negotiating the agreement regarding an
equal protection exemption. In this case, however, the United States
both endorsed the idea of an exemption from equal protection guar-
antees and required the NMI to enact the racially restrictive Cove-
nant. Therefore, the United States' action of agreeing to Covenant
section 805, a racially based restriction, is unconstitutional.
In Wabol, the Ninth Circuit endorsed Congress' power to grant
equal protection guarantees to the NMI in a racially discriminatory
manner. This conclusion ignored that the exclusion was racially dis-
criminatory and therefore in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. Congress extended to the NMI almost the full force of
equal protection guarantees in the Covenant against United States
and NMI government action, but granted an exclusion that requires
racial discrimination.' 7 1 The heart of equal protection is the protec-
tion it affords individuals against racial discrimination. 72 If Congress
grants a right, it must grant it in compliance with the Constitution and
without racial discrimination. Congress cannot carve out exceptions
166. Id. at 606-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 607-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. See Lawson, supra note 28.
169. One could also argue that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment is not as extensive as that of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment
incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection component in the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has stated that the guarantees are
co-extensive. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-08 (1995).
170. There is nothing in the Constitution that distinguishes a territory or possession of
the United States from a Commonwealth. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit simultaneously ruled
in Wabol that Congress governs the NMI under the Territorial Clause. Wabol, 958 F.2d at
1459.
171. Covenant § 805.
172. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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for itself in granting rights where the exceptions in the grant run
counter to the equal protection clause. 73
The Territorial Clause does not justify United States abridgment
of the Constitution over its own citizens. The Territorial Clause
should not sanction this perverse exercise of power because congres-
sional power to legislate under the territorial clause, like every other
legislative power, is subject to the constitutional restrictions contained
in the Bill of Rights. 74 The Insular Cases doctrine has never made an
exception for the equal protection clause. Arguably, the Insular Cases
should be completely disregarded where the United States is sover-
eign by consent and the inhabitants have United States citizenship. 175
Equal protection is a shield that attaches to a United States citi-
zen wherever that citizen is subject to United States government ac-
tion.1 76 To hold that the United States government may ignore equal
173. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection component restricts Congressional action).
174. See Lawson, supra note 28, at 867 (arguing that the Territorial Clause is subject to
the constraints of the Appointments Clause).
175. Some commentators have argued that the Insular Cases should be overruled on
various other grounds. See Liebowitz, supra note 7; TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 5, 268
(1985); Joycelyn Hewlett, The Virgin Islands; Grand Jury Denied, 35 How. L.J. 263, 273
(1992). The Insular Cases-for reasons that are not necessarily admirable-took liberties
with the application of the United States Constitution beyond the fifty states giving Con-
gress more power in the form of providing less protection for individual rights. The motive
was to avoid bestowing United States citizenship upon the inhabitants of these distant
lands while maintaining expansionist policies. See Neuman, supra note 1, at n.286, 334.
These are not abiding or admirable principles upon which to build a legal theory. See
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,287 (1901) (questioning whether the Bill of Rights had to
be fully extended to territories populated "by alien races, differing from us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought"). Justice Black, writing for the
plurality in Reid, said that only fundamental constitutional rights applied in unincorporated
territories because of their "wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions." 354 U.S. at 14.
Considerations of distance also played a role in the Insular Cases. That factor, key in
the early 1900s, retains no relevance in this era of modem transportation and communica-
tion. The NMI is neither isolated nor untouched by outside influence. Branch, supra note
39, at 66 (assumptions about isolation "are not valid today where all the territories have
television, direct communications with the States, automobiles, jet airplane transportation,
and when many of the inhabitants have high school and college education, and where vir-
tually all speak and understand English").
176. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("These provisions [the Four-
teenth Amendment] are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race or color, or nationality; and the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.").
This is not the case where the Supreme Court has held that the inherent limitations on
the constitutional provision itself frees United States goyernment action outside the fifty
states' borders. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (actions of the
United States on foreign soil against a Mexican citizen with no significant connections to
the U.S. were not constrained by the Fourth Amendment); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
Spring 19951 THE CONSTITUTION IN THE TERRITORIES 741
protection guarantees as to its own citizens on United States territory
is a novel and unjustifiable ruling.
IV. Reliance on the Wrong Policy
The Ninth Circuit's creation of an equal protection exemption
zone is inconsistent with case law and moves the case law in the wrong
direction.'" The Insular Cases "fundamental rights" test at least set a
minimum level of individual constitutional guarantees for territorial
residents-the Ninth Circuit's test removes any floor. Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit's legal gyrations only succeed in saving a fundamentally
flawed land alienation restriction. Neither the journey nor the desti-
nation are worth the price paid.
Two policy concerns drive the Wabol decision's result. First, the
Ninth Circuit thought that Covenant section 805 protected NMI cul-
ture.178 Second, the Ninth Circuit perceived that declaring section 805
unconstitutional would amount to a rewriting of the covenant and un-
dermine the consensual nature of the NMI's union with the United
States. 179
The Ninth Circuit's concerns were misplaced because Covenant
section 805 does not protect NMI culture in design or practice. More-
over, the focus on the land alienation restriction diverted attention
from the real factors threatening the NMI's cultural base. Other less
drastic and equally effective protections were available.
Nor would subjecting Covenant section 805 to equal protection
review undermine the consensual nature of the Covenant. At the
244, 287 (1901) (Revenue Clause providing that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States" did not encompass Puerto Rico.).
177. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Wabol. Wabol v. Vil-
lacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 675 (1992). One problem with
granting certiorari in Wabol was that a jurisdictional issue would have confronted the
Supreme Court at the outset. Id. at 1453-58. The Ninth Circuit and the newly created NMI
Supreme Court were at odds over who had jurisdiction over the case, with the Ninth Cir-
cuit ultimately claiming victory. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 11 F.3d 124, 126 (9th Cir. 1993). The
NMI Supreme Court reluctantly agreed. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, No. 89-005 (Villagomez,
J., concurring) (NMI Sup. Ct. filed April 6, 1994).
The Supreme Court may have been reluctant to accept this case as a vehicle for decid-
ing the issue presented because it would have to confront the jurisdictional issue first. See
Izumi Seimitsu v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425,427 (1993). Of course, the Court could
have decided against granting certiorari for hundreds of other reasons.
178. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461.
179. Id. at 1462. Although it did not explicitly discuss this issue, the court also might
have been unsure of the consequences for the entire agreement of striking down § 805
because the Covenant provides that § 805 cannot be altered without the mutual consent of
the NMI and the United States. Covenant § 105.
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time it was ratified, the parties knew that section 805 was subject to
judicial review. Even treaties are necessarily subject to judicial
review.
The Ninth Circuit's decision sanctions a loss of constitutional pro-
tections in the territories. By endorsing a broad power in United
States negotiators to cut and paste the United States Constitution, the
Ninth Circuit opened the door to race and gender-based discrimina-
tion and other losses of liberties for residents of territories. The Ninth
Circuit's rule encourages an ad hoc result-oriented approach to the
application of the Constitution. As negotiators and courts make their
determinations, the result will be an outcome that undermines the le-
gitimacy of the United States Constitution for all United States
citizens.
A. Covenant Section 805: Preserving the Cultural Base?
1. The Goal-Protection of NMI Culture
In theory, Covenant section 805 aimed to: (1) protect NMI per-
sons from exploitation; (2) promote economic advancement and self-
sufficiency; and (3) recognize the importance of ownership of land for
the culture and traditions of the people of the NMI. °80 In the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, Covenant section 805 prevents the demise of NMI
culture. The Ninth Circuit expressed its sentiments in a passage near
the close of its opinion:
It would truly be anomalous to construe the equal protection
clause to force the United States to break its pledge to preserve
and protect NMI culture and property. The Bill of Rights was
not intended to interfere with the performance of our interna-
tional obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide
pact for diverse native cultures.'
In relying on the "cultural genocide" argument to override the
application of equal protection, however, the court avoids the ques-
180. Covenant § 805.
181. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462. See Laughlin, supra note 102, at 377-78. The author
proposes application of the Equal Protection Clause generally and intermediate scrutiny
specifically to any claimed exceptions in American Samoa:
In order to prevail on the issue in a mainland court, the territory will have to (1)
argue for modification of strict scrutiny and the application of an intermediate
standard of review, and (2) document both the central role of land in the preser-
vation of fa'a Samoa and the lack of practical alternatives by which the Govern-
ment could "achieve its ends in the foreseeable future without the use of race
conscious measures."
Idt at 385 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 376 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part).
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tion whether a race-based land alienation restriction is consistent with
equal protection guarantees."s An idea or practice may be compel-
ling or important enough to comply with equal protection scrutiny,
but it has never overridden application of equal protection scrutiny. If
the goals were as compelling as the Ninth Circuit claims, why not ap-
ply equal protection standards? The answer is that even a curt exami-
nation under traditional analysis would reveal troubling questions
about the goals and means of achieving them. The Ninth Circuit
chose to eliminate the test, the more rigorous scrutiny, and any spe-
cific inquiry into the NMI situation. Its discussion barely scuffs the
surface of a complex problem.
For example, one of the Ninth Circuit's supporting citation for its
proposition was a law review article concerning land alienation in
American Samoa. s3 Analogies to other "diverse native cultures"'
are flawed, however, because other cultures employ diverse alienation
schemes. Samoa's alienation patterns differ from those in the NMI-
Samoans tend to hold their land by clan, 85 while individual ownership
and alienation has been the dominant pattern in the NMI for 350
years. 86 If one wants to limit the loss of land in a culture in which
individual ownership has been the rule, different rules will be required
than where clan ownership defines the land tenure system. Thus,
although protecting the culture may be a goal shared by various terri-
tories, the means will depend upon the culture.
Although claiming that "it is understandable that the islanders'
vision does not precisely coincide with mainland attitudes toward
property and our commitment to the ideal of equal opportunity in its
acquisition,"'8 7 the court could have more fully explored or analyzed
what this vision was, is, and how the land alienation restriction fur-
thers either the past or present vision in the NI.1ss Without examin-
ing the former or current conditions in any detail, the Ninth Circuit
182. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
183. ld. (citing Laughlin, supra note 2, at 386-88).
184. Id.
185. LiEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 430 ("The communal land system, covering approxi-
mately 92 percent of the land area of American Samoa, is the key to the land tenure sys-
tem.") (footnotes omitted).
186. See Wabol v. Muna, 2 Commw. Rptr. 231, 247 (Commw. Tr. Ct. 1985) ("By the
time of the Spanish administration period in the islands, the land tenure system for the
Chamorros had become directed to individual ownership as contrasted with clan or lineage
ownership.").
187. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
188. This same superficial gloss characterized other justifications of the land alienation
restriction as well. In defending the restriction, two consultants to the Northern Marianas
Constitutional Convention in 1976 stated:
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stated that "[i]t appears that land is principally important in the Com-
monwealth not for its economic value but for its stabilizing effect on
the natives' social system." '189 The Court also noted that "[land] tradi-
tionally passes from generation to generation creating family identity
and contributing to the economic well-being of family members." 190
Yet it did not explore how this identity or economic well-being would
be maintained if the land were alienated to another person of NMI
descent. The Ninth Circuit announced a rhetorically compelling goal,
but did not explain or describe it beyond the legislative justification.
Moreover, the means of implementing this goal were not examined.
2. Unimpressive Implementation
a. Land as the Proxy for a Complicated Problem-Race as the
Easiest Answer
Implementation of section 805 undermines its goals of preserving
land ownership, protecting culture, and avoiding exploitation. Section
805 allows persons of NMI descent to acquire unlimited amounts of
land from other persons of NMI descent. Section 805 places no con-
trols on these acquisitions. Interestingly, if the racial restriction was
intended to prevent the people of the NMI from losing their lands or
being exploited, it incorrectly assumes: (1) there is no threat of ex-
ploitation or cultural dislocation when NMI persons sell their land to
ambitious or unscrupulous persons who happen to be of the correct
The residents of the Northern Marianas have developed a substantial expectation
that their government would and should equalize economic bargaining power by
erecting legal barriers. If long-term interests cannot be alienated, disadvanta-
geous short-term arrangements can be undone at the end of their term and no
permanent dislocation will result from the relative inexperience of the Northern
Marianas people. Recent experience in neighboring Guam-where the absence
of such a restriction resulted in the transfer of ownership of more than half of the
privately owned land to non-Guamanians in a few decades-indicated that a simi-
lar result could be expected in the Northern Marianas unless an appropriate re-
striction was imposed while the Commonwealth develops as a self-governing
entity.
Willens & Siemer, supra note 2, at 1407-08 (footnote omitted).
The authors ignore the effects of a 40-year dislocation on culture through the permissi-
ble leasing system. There are no protections from predators of Northern Marianas de-
scent. Further, they cite only to a phone conversation with a legislative assistant to the
Guam delegate to the United States House of Representatives for the proposition that the
absence of a land alienation restriction resulted in the transfer of half the privately held
land to non-Guamanians. Id. at 1408 n.143. As shown by the NMI experience, half the
privately held land on Guam may have been transferred, but it was probably not due to the
lack of a land alienation restriction of this type.
189. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461 (citation omitted).
190. ld. (quoting ANALYsIs OF THE CoNsTrruTiON OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 174-76 (1976)).
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NMI ancestry; or (2) there are no persons of NMI descent who would
exploit persons of NMI descent. 9' The Court and Section 805 also
assume that all outsiders constitute a threat.192
Moreover, if the culture of the NMI is truly dependent on the
land, it is ridiculous to suggest that outright sales will disrupt the cul-
ture, but that long-term leases will not. These fifty-five-year leases
displace NMI persons regardless of the effect on the culture. Section
805 offers no protection from such long-term leases, except on the
chance that the culture will resurge after several decades of outsider
occupancy. Imagine the five year old child, whose parents leased the
land for fifty-five years. What ties will the child have with the cul-
ture-if the culture is tied to the land-at age 60?
Ironically, section 805 also allows a person of NMI descent who
has never lived in the NMI (but has an ancestor who did) to buy land.
Simultaneously, section 805 disenfranchises persons of other races
who have life-long ties to the NMI. Nor does it matter that a person
of NMI descent builds a casino on their property or buys lands from
another NMI person to do that, despite the changes that a casino may
pose to the culture.
The negotiators of the Covenant claimed that the people of the
NMI wished to forego outside intrusion and proceed slowly along the
development path. They wished to limit the ability to alienate land
191. See Branch, supra note 39, at 62 (noting problems within families when war-claims
money was distributed). See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race.... Classifying persons according to their race is more likely
to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concern; the race, not the person, dictates
the category.") (citations omitted). The restriction operates on the assumption that the
economic and social advantages of outsiders are the main problems to address regarding
potential exploitation. This approach fails to take into account the social, economic, and
psychological exploitation that may be practiced by insiders as well. See infra note 222.
192. Itt Statutes and laws in the United States once barred persons of different races
and ancestries from owning land. Some of the rationales behind these laws were the same
as those put forth for the land alienation restriction here, e.g., a fear that a particular group
would take over and control the states' lands. See Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 627-
28 (Cal. 1952) (California law barring Japanese aliens from owning or occupying land in
California based on a fear that the Japanese would take over a sizable portion of land and
control the state's agricultural lands). The California Supreme Court in Sel Fujii held that
the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the United Nations Charter because
the Charter is not self-executing.
The intermediate appellate court in the Sel Fujii case based its reversal of the land
alienation restriction on the U.N. Charter, indicating some recognition that the charter-
an international document-endorsed the right to alienate land without racial discrimina-
tion. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486-88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950). The California
Supreme Court upheld the result but reversed the rationale, finding that the U.N. provi-
sions were too vague to create enforceable rights. Sel Fujii, 242 P.2d at 619-22.
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until they established a firmer anchor in the world. Such claims ap-
pear on the surface as impressive attempts at maintaining cultural
identity. The problem, however, is that the negotiators' evaluation
ended with a recitation of the goal and little examination of the
means. The sole focus on land ownership allowed other factors-as
important as land ownership in achieving the goals-to be ignored.
Section 805 also allocates blame for any cultural ill-effects on outsid-
ers, ignoring any internal responsibility for the situation. History
teaches that racial classifications often are the remedy of choice but
seldom solve the problems used to justify them.193 This case was no
different.
Land ownership alone does not bind the NMI culture to the NMI
people. Rather, land ownership is one of a number of factors that
interact in the cultural ecosystem. A close-knit family structure and
common languages, for example, contribute to the culture of the NMI.
Even assuming land ownership is the critical link to culture, it is an
individual's link to the land that provides the tie.194 The idea of pro-
tecting cultural identity through retaining land ownership in any NMI
person's name is nonsensical. Moreover, section 805 enables NMI
culture to be threatened by other factors by failing to acknowledge
and provide for such factors. For example, land alienation restrictions
do not preclude local leadership from adopting casino gambling, al-
lowing unlimited immigration as a source of cheap labor, limiting en-
vironmental protections, and fighting land use restrictions and zoning
codes.195 All of these measures, however, are equally devastating to
culture and tradition as changes in land ownership because they in-
trude on the culture and change it.
The folly of treating land ownership as isolated from other effects
upon the culture is illustrated by the NMI's recent history. The
change to a cash economy-that occurred years ago-increases the
pressure to sell land. Before World War II, the NMI's economy
changed from that of a subsistence to a cash economy. The Japanese
developed an agricultural economy, leasing a large amount of private
land from NMI inhabitants (estimated to be about 75% of the private
193. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according to
their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns . .. ").
194. Even the Ninth Circuit acknowledged this point. See Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461
("[Land] traditionally passes from generation to generation creating family identity and
contributing to the economic well-being of family members.").
195. See Marybeth Herald, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Change in Course Under
Its Covenant with the United States, 71 OR. L. REv. 127, 186-87 (1992).
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land).196 The NMI's economy changed further after the United States
took control of the islands under the Trusteeship Agreement and then
with the arrival of war claims money.197 The economy continued to
change as Covenant funds have flowed into the NMI.198 Indeed, the
Covenant guarantees intrusions on the culture by guaranteeing many
federal programs-including federal welfare, nutrition assistance, so-
cial security, and legal services programs. 99 Pushes for economic de-
velopment and higher standards of living, including health and
education programs, inevitably result in cultural change.20 0  While
proclaiming a duty to protect the NMI from too much outside intru-
sion, the negotiations maximized federal financial intrusion and influ-
ence. The land alienation restriction has not stood up to powerful
market forces that encourage alienation. Economic development
drives up land prices and decreases dependence on the land.
196. See generally Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 2 Commw. Rptr.
598, 642 (D. N. MAR. I. 1986) ("Thus the local inhabitants to a large extent lived off the
rents obtained from the family land. Also, the inhabitants obtained more income from
employment as teachers, policemen, stevedores, nurses, and the like. A money economy
began to evolve.") (footnotes omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 881 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990).
197. Id. at 610 ("The United States' administration of the Trust Territory produced a
rapid change in the economy of the islands, substituting a money economy for the subsis-
tence economy familiar to the people. The post-war money economy has been heavily
dependent on government employment.").
198. Covenant § 701 (United States promised to "assist the Government of the North-
ern Mariana Islands in its efforts to achieve a progressively higher standard of living for its
people as part of the American economic community."). Covenant § 904 (b) ("United
States will assist and facilitate the establishment by the Northern Mariana Islands of offices
in the United States and abroad to promote local tourism and other economic or cultural
interests of the Northern Mariana Islands.")
199. Covenant § 703(a).
200. The current Governor of the NMI, Froilan Tenorio, testified before a congres-
sional committee blaming the Trust Territory for luring the people of the NMI into govern-
ment desk jobs. He then noted:
Worse, we were inculcated with a welfare mentality. Uncle Sam paid the bills and
cleaned up the messes, and we came to rely on that. Our rapid economic devel-
opment in the 1980s did little to change this underlying psychology ... Most
stayed close to a government that grew even faster than our booming economy.
An endless supply of alien workers to do society's dirty jobs did little to promote
social responsibility.
Hearing on H.R. 602, The "Omnibus Territories Act," Before the Subcomm. on Native
American and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(January 31, 1995) (statement of Froilan C. Tenorio, Governor of the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands) (on file with author).
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b. The Problem Is Outside Pressure; the Solution Is a Restriction
Designed with the Help of Outside Pressure?
Covenant section 805 sought to address the problem of outside
pressure exerted on the local community. Negotiators feared that out-
siders would exert undue pressure on people of Northern Marianas
descent to sell long-term interests in land for immediate short-term
gains.2 °1 Interestingly, the Covenant left the implementation of sec-
tion 805 completely to the people of the NMI. 02 The pressure that
outsiders may exert, however, may also be used to shape the design
and operation of the restriction. Article XII of the NMI Constitution,
which implements section 805, reflects this tension. Article XII of the
NMI Constitution allows "outsiders" to lease land in the NMI and
permits persons of NMI descent to buy, sell, and lease land freely.
The leasehold period allowed the outsiders was lengthy-beginning
with forty years and then increasing to fifty-five years. The lengthy
leasehold periods do not allow each generation a choice, but rather
displace succeeding generations.
Immigration control, a power granted the NMI under the Cove-
nant, illustrates a similar problem. 0 3 The NMI retained the power to
"cope with the problems which unrestricted immigration may impose
upon small island communities. ''204 This provision was based on con-
cerns similar to the land restrictions-that outsiders would change
NMI culture. If United States immigration controlled the process, the
negotiators apparently feared that Asian immigrants to the United
States would relocate in the NMI, thereby upsetting the cultural bal-
201. See Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Hearing on H.J. Res. 549
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1975) [hereinafter
H.J. Res. 549 Hearing] (administration comments on Senator Gary W. Hart's oral and
written statements) ("The purpose of [§ 805] is not to confer an undue privilege but is
rather to protect the people of the Northern Mariana Islands from exploitation from ag-
gressive and economically more advanced outside groups."). See also Wabol v. Villacrusis,
958 F.2d 1450, 1461 ("The land alienation restrictions are properly viewed as an attempt,
albeit a paternalistic one, to prevent the inhabitants from selling their cultural anchor for
short-term economic gain, thereby protecting local culture and values and preventing ex-
ploitation of the inexperienced islanders at the hands of resourceful and comparatively
wealthy outside investors.").
202. Covenant § 805.
203. Covenant § 503 (federal immigration laws "presently inapplicable to the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands, will not apply to the Northern Mariana Islands except in the
manner and to the extent made applicable to them by Congress by law after termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement").
204. Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 78.
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ance.2 5 That was the theory behind ceding immigration control to the
NMI. The 1990 census, however, shows that the NMI population has
more than doubled since 1980, and that politically disenfranchised
alien workers composed at least 52% of the NMI's total population in
1990 of 43,345.21 The number of resident alien workers has grown
tenfold in the last ten years, as alien workers from surrounding Asian
countries legally enter and work in the NMI.2 °7 Their presence pro-
duces dramatic long and short term effects on the population.2 °s
These statistics demonstrate that the NMI community opted for
swift economic development at the price of swift cultural change.
Businesses wanted to import a cheap and malleable labor force to fuel
the economic boom, and NMI government leaders accommodated
them. °9 The outside pressures that the negotiators feared would
cause rapid cultural change did in fact result. In this case, however,
the problem was only exacerbated by the Covenant negotiators' solu-
tion of placing immigration controls with the NMI.
c. Majority Enforcement of a Racial Restriction Against a Minority
Racial restrictions imposed upon a political minority by the polit-
ical majority are troublesome.21 0 The Ninth Circuit, however, simply
205. Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 78 ("The reason this provision [Cove-
nant § 503] is included is to cope with the problems which unrestricted immigration may
impose upon small island communities.").
206. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING, COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
(March, 1992) at 16. More recently, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Territo-
rial and International Affairs told a Senate Committee that the "CNMI population rose
from 17,900 in 1980 to 62,800 in 1993 with indigenous residents falling from 66.6 percent to
36.5 percent of the population-non-resident aliens, most of whom are legally admitted,
now account for 58.89 percent of the population." Hearing Regarding Immigration Into the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and Immigration Questions Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Mineral Resources Before the Senate Subcommittee on Mineral Re-
sources Development and Production, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (September 22, 1994) (testi-
mony of Allen P. Stayman).
207. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS, supra
note 206, at 18; see generally Herald, supra note 195.
208. See Herald, supra note 195, at 173-80; see also Ferdie de la Torre, Filipino Births
Still Do Outnumber Chamorro, MARIANAS VARIETY, Aug. 26,1994, at 1. Children born in
the NMI are automatically U.S. citizens so the NMI already may anticipate a long-term
change in its population structure no matter how it acts to stem the current tide of legal
immigration.
209. See Herald, supra note 195. Tenorio, supra note 200 (NMI Governor asserted that
the main reasons why the NMI government could raise large public revenues is that the
NMI "can offer investment incentives, such as low business taxes, a lower minimum wage,
and easy entry of necessary foreign workers.").
210. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (where five
of nine city council seats were held by African Americans and population was 50% African
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rubber-stamped the methods that the NMI chose to implement the
congressional directive to discriminate in the ownership of real prop-
erty. There is an inherent hazard when persons of the favored classifi-
cation control implementation of that classification.21' Ironically, the
Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the small and family-centered
structure of NMI society imposes some limitations on the traditional
justice system. In upholding the NMI's exemption from the proce-
dural requirement of jury trials in local criminal cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit emphasized the importance of the exemption, explaining that the
limitation was justified because "the small, closely knit population in
the Northern Mariana Islands might lead to acquittals of guilty per-
sons in criminal cases. '212
The Ninth Circuit encountered this problem again in a recent
case where it labeled the NMI Supreme Court's construction of the
land alienation restriction of its Constitution "untenable. ' 213  The
NMI Supreme Court had assembled an elaborate resulting trust the-
ory that allowed an NMI descent landowner to void a land sale based
on the NMI purchaser's allegedly unconstitutional agreement with a
lessee.21 4 Again, the aim was to provide advantage to those of NMI
descent at the expense of outsider groups. The Ninth Circuit in Wabol,
disregarded this inherent problem when it acknowledged that
although the land alienation restriction might be misused by insiders,
American, "[Cloncem that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a
minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate
for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny.. ." of affirmative action
programs).
211. Id. at 522-23 ("The struggle for racial justice has historically been a struggle by the
national society against oppression in the individual States .... [because of the] heightened
danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units ...
(Scalia, J., concurring).
212. Northern Mariana Islands v. Magofna, 919 F.2d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted). See also LmBowrrz, supra note 7, at 526 (the extended family is still the basic
social and political unit of NMI society).
213. Ferreira v. Borja, I F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[t]he Common-
wealth cannot constitutionally deprive a person of a property interest through the expedi-
ent of an untenable judicial interpretation of local law that denies that a property interest
ever existed"). See generally, Comment, Ferreira v. Borja: Land Transactions in the North-
ern Marianas, 29 NEw ENG. L. Rnv. 209 (1994).
214. The contortions that the NMI Supreme Court had to engage in to reach this result
are fascinating but beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the decision
undermined the land title system in the NMI, but resulted in a number of "original" land-
owners being entitled to sue to recover their land when the price of land had sufficiently
inflated during the booming 1980s. The challenges were based on unrecorded transactions
between the NMI purchaser and their lessee. Ferreira v. Borja, 1 F.3d at 961, 963.
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any changes in the system would have to be implemented through the
political process, which is controlled by persons of NMI descent.215
The Wabol court's decision is particularly insufficient when con-
sidered in context. Even benign classifications based on race where
the majority penalizes itself are considered so potentially dangerous
that they are subject to a heightened level of review.21 6 To allow ra-
cially based treatment in these circumstances is both unprecedented
and unwise.
3. The Results Are Clear
It is now difficult to argue that restricting the alienation of land in
the NMI to NMI persons will protect the culture and traditions of the
NMI. During the last two decades, the NMI itself opted to enter the
global economy.217 The resulting disruption to culture, traditions, and
215. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1463 n.23.
216. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (providing for strict
scrutiny for Congressionally mandated benign race-based classifications); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring strict scrutiny for state-mandated
benign race-based classifications).
217. Consider the description offered by a former Peace Corps volunteer who had lived
in Saipan in the 1970s and returned for a visit in the late 1980s:
Down the road, I cruise past what used to be the White Sands Hotel, where we
wrote a constitution. Now it's a Miami Beach-scale place called the Pacific Is-
lands Club, a staff of gung-ho "club-mates" helping vacationers enjoy themselves.
They've got waterslides and a Disney-esque Spanish galleon picturesquely
wrecked on some rocks around the swimming pool. Next I come into the
crowded part of the island, San Antonio Village, Chalan Kanoa, and Susupe, a
gamut of tourist shops, mini shopping malls, Korean and Chinese restaurants,
beauty parlors, discos, gaming rooms, and target-shooting parlors. The road is
jammed and there is construction everywhere; not the wishful construction I saw
in Truk, where a year-old pile of sand and a few rods of rusted re-bar say maybe
we will, maybe we won't, but hectic under-the-gun hard-hatting Koreans and Fili-
pinos working like they work in Saudi Arabia. Then, more hotels, the Saipan
Grand, the old Royal Taga, renamed and expanded.
Past Susupe, the road runs close to the beach, too close to permit construc-
tion on the ocean side. Here, I find the same placid, grassy shoreline I remember,
parked cars and picnic tables under graceful, soft-needled ironwood trees. But
right across the road, on the inland side, the hits just keep on coming: car dealer-
ships, Chinese restaurants, hotels and motels, duty-free shops. One continuous
blur, all the way to Garapan where there's another cluster of hotels, the ten-story
HafaAdai, the Hyatt, and the Intercontinental, big deals that have spawned a
whole zone-the Ginza, it's called-of smaller operations, video rentals, curry
houses, soft ice cream, moped rentals, strip joints, you name it: Athlete's Foot,
Winchell's Donuts. Flags of all nations fly outside the Duty Free Shopping
Center. It looks like an embassy.
P.F. KLuGE, TiE EDGE OF PARADISE: AMERICA IN MICROrNSIA 123 (1991). Compare
William H. Stewart, Looking Back at Saipan, 1970s, MARIANA'S VARIMTY, December 9,
1994 at 30 ("By the late summer of 1970, the islands were almost devoid of the amenities of
the last quarter of the twentieth century... There were only two hotels... The number of
island restaurants could be counted on one hand.").
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the environment has occurred despite any racially based land aliena-
tion restrictions.
Economic development boomed in the NMI in the 1980s, with
hotel development and tourist arrivals dramatically increasing, all with
the approval and support of the NMI government.2 18 Tmian, one of
the smaller islands in the NMI, voted to allow casino gambling, and
the establishment of five casino gambling resorts is now authorized
under local law.219 The Island of Rota unsuccessfully attempted to
follow suit. 0 Saipan has legalized poker and pachinko machines.22
The NMI also developed a garment industry that has over 20 plants
which are mostly alien owned and operated.
Land is freely alienated to wealthier persons of NMI descent,2 n
and hotel and resort development, csino gambling, and garment fac-
tories all achieved anchors in the community, despite the land aliena-
tion restriction. Low-paid foreign domestic workers are employed in
a majority of NMI households. 223 Because of the changes, Chamorro
and Carolinian languages must struggle to survive.
NMI culture cannot survive a plague of alcoholism, drugs, and
prostitution, or unlimited immigration that diversifies the composition
218. Office of Planning & Budget, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Eco-
nomic Development Strategy: A Prospectus for Guiding Growth, 36-46 (2d rev. ed. 1993)
[hereinafter "Economic Development Strategy"]; Herald, supra note 195.
219. Tinian Local Initiative 1 (1989).
220. Rota Local Initiative 2 (1993); Rota Local Initiative 1 (1991).
221. See Raphael H. Arroyo, Pachinko Bill Becomes Law, MARIANAS VARmTY, Febru-
ary 17, 1995, at 3; 6 C.M.C. § 3152 (stating legislative finding that certain forms of gam-
bling, such as poker machines require a higher degree of skill and "are more readily
accepted by the people of the Commonwealth.").
222. See, e.g., Amy Gretsch, Joe Millions, GUAM Bus. NEws, July 1989, at 56 (detailing
land-wealth of persons of NMI descent acquired in part by purchase of land from NMI
persons who lost money in poker machines); Nancy Shaw, Paradise?, GUAM Bus. NEWS,
July 1990 at 8, 10 (noting acquisition of Tinian land by persons of NMI descent following
enactment of casino gambling law); see also Tom Brown, Beyond the Reef, SEATLE TIMES,
May 13, 1990, at J1 ("Some of the indigenous Chamorro and Carolinian families that made
instant fortunes on their land-prime waterfront property goes for $1,000 a square
meter-spent the money just as fast as they made it and now have neither money nor land.
Other families have been split by disputes over property that is suddenly valuable.").
223. According to at least one survey, domestic workers topped the list of foreign labor-
ers employed in the NMI in 1993 at 2,068. There were also 586 foreign workers employed
as farm workers. Rafael I. Santos, House Helps Top RP Worker Lists, MARIANAS VARI-
ETY, June 17, 1994, at 1, 18. Both categories of workers are exempt from the NMI's mini-
mum wage of $2.45 an hour. 4 C.M.C. § 9223(a). Their minimum wage is $200 per month,
with the limitation that they may not be worked for over 72 hours per week without re-
ceiving overtime. 4 C.M.C. § 9223(b).
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of the island population and changes the family structure.224 The
human rights issues that have arisen from the changing population
base and the alien workers' tenuous life in the NMI have presented
some complex issues of coping with a multi-cultural society.225
The changes in the NMI occurred in part because the land aliena-
tion restriction served as an effective diversion from the real problems
and tough decisions that any society must make to regulate economic
development. Employing a race-based limit on one aspect of the cul-
tural ecosystem-land ownership-failed to achieve its goal and di-
verted attention from many other aspects that define and support a
culture.
B. Preserving the Consensual Nature of the Agreement
1. Working With a Fait Accompli
In deciding Wabol, the Ninth Circuit was reluctant to tamper with
the agreement between the NMI and the United States. The Ninth
Circuit was uncomfortable with the notion that the United States and
the NMI agreed to the Covenant, but a court could invalidate one of
its key provisions. The court emphasized that the Covenant was an
"international obligation" of the United States. Whether the Cove-
nant is an "international obligation," however, is a disputed proposi-
tion. The Covenant is an instrument of political union by which the
224. See Herald, supra note 195, at 173-80; Ferdie de la Torre, DCCA Sees Increase in
Child Abuse Cases, MARIANAS VARmTY, Apr. 7, 1994, at 1, 9; Ferdie de la Torre, Alcohol
'Epidemic' Grips NMI, MARIANAS VARmTY, Apr. 1, 1994, at 1, 28. Ferdie de la Torre, 88
Kids Sexually Abused in '93, MARIANAS VARIETY, April 8, 1994, at 3 (social worker "said
that among the main factors which contribute to the growing number of child[ren] being
sexually molested were drugs, economic problems, and poor relationship[s] within the
family").
225. See, e.g., William Branigin, U.S. Pacific Paradise Is Hell For Some Foreign Workers;
Filipinos Report Beatings, Rapes, Lockups, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al; Philip She-
non, Made in the U.S.A.?-Hard Labor on a Pacific Island, N.Y. TrmisS, July 18, 1993, § 1
at 1.
See also Hearing on H.R. 602, The "Omnibus Territories Act," Before the Subcomm. on
Native American and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel of the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service) ("[Tihis population growth has severely tested local social
services.... Immigration authorities have no reliable records of aliens who have entered
the CNMI, how long they remain, and when, if ever, they depart.... Furthermore, there
appears to be some measure of cultural and political resistance in this area.") (on file with
author). A Philippine Senate Committee recently listed the NMI as one of five places
which were dangerous destinations for Filipino contract workers. Also included on the list
were Malaysia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. See NMI Tops "High Risk" List for RP Workers,
MARIANAS VARIETY, January 9, 1995, at 1.
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Northern Marianas became a part of the United States.226 The Cove-
nant was approved by a joint resolution of Congress and signed by the
President. Moreover, as noted earlier, Congress may not ignore the
Constitution through the use of its treaty power.227
Though it did not directly address this issue, the Ninth Circuit
may have feared the repercussions of invalidating Covenant section
805 as unconstitutional. Covenant section 105 provides that the "mu-
tual consent" of the NMI and the United States is necessary to alter
several provisions of the Covenant. The meaning of this provision,
however, is that Congress (not the judiciary) cannot unilaterally
change Covenant section 805 through its power to enact legislation
under the Covenant.228 The NMI was well aware that the land aliena-
tion restriction mandated by Covenant section 805 might be chal-
lenged in federal courts and ultimately held unconstitutional.229 The
Covenant also specifically provides for review in federal court.230
226. See, e.g., Senate Committee Report, supra note 88, at 91; Northern Mariana Is-
lands: Hearing on S.J. Res. 107 Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
of the House Comm. on Resources, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 486 (1975) [hereinafter S.J. Res.
107 Hearing]. During the Covenant approval process, executive branch officials denied
that the Covenant was an international agreement because "[t]he Marianas are not a for-
eign country." H.J. Res. 549 Hearing, supra note 201, at 64-65 (revised testimony by Dep-
uty Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll); id. at 64 (executive branch comments in
response to Senator Hart's claim that the Covenant was a treaty). But see Roger S. Clark,
Self-Determination and Free Association-Should the United Nations Terminate The Pacific
Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 14 n.72, 18 n.93, 32-33 n.197 (1980).
227. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
228. See LIBowrrz, supra note 7, at 539-40, 543 ("[Section 105] is a unique, specific
limitation of Congress' territorial clause authority."). See Senate Committee Report, supra
note 88, at 67; S.J. Res. 107 Hearings, supra note 226, at 364, 371-77.
There would be a constitutional problem with a congressional attempt to preempt
judicial review of the constitutionality of a congressional action. See Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
229. Even in the negotiations as the MPSC sought to expand the mutual consent provi-
sions to limit Congress' authority under the Territorial Clause, the United States negotia-
tors warned that "[o]f course, it cannot be said with certainty what courts will say about the
restrictions which may be imposed in this agreement on Congress' authority under IV-3-2
[the Territorial Clause]"). Arnold H. Liebowitz, The Marianas Covenant Negotiations, 4
FORDHAM INV'L L.J. 19, 27 n.30 (1981) (citation omitted). See generally Briefing Papers
for the Delegates to the Northern Mariana Constitutional Convention; Briefing Paper No.
12, Restrictions on Land Alienation at 10 n.5 (1976) ("Section 501 attempts to insulate
§ 805 from the effects of otherwise applicable portions of the United States Constitution
but it is not clear that the courts will give effect to § 501 because American courts are
reluctant to exempt American governments from limitations on their own powers.") (on
file with author).
230. Covenant § 903 ("Nothing herein shall prevent the presentation of cases or contro-
versies arising under this Covenant to courts established by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.").
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Finally, despite self-serving language in the Covenant," 1 the
claim that the land alienation restriction was "fundamental" to the
NMI must be viewed with some skepticism. Although the legislative
history indicates that the United States thought that the land aliena-
tion restriction was important, the NMI negotiators did not consider it
fundamental and questioned the wisdom of making it mandatory.232
The NMI's acknowledged open door development policy raises fur-
ther doubts about its commitment to the "fundamental" goals of sec-
tion 805.33 Proper equal protection scrutiny would have enabled the
lower court to explore the impact of a court-ordered modification, and
weigh that impact, if any, against the petitioner's equal protection
interests.
2. Negotiating the United States Constitution
The Ninth Circuit expressed discomfort with the idea that the
NMI must abide by United States constitutional provisions (or laws)
when they are viewed as inappropriate for the territory. One com-
mentator argues that the Ninth Circuit based its decision in Wabol on
the belief that:
... American rule over the NMI derives its legitimacy from the
consent of the NMI people and from the United States' respect
for the NMI's unique customs and values. As a result, the court
has concluded that certain constitutional rights are at odds with
local ways need not be strictly applied there, provided that the
territorial inhabitants themselves demanded release from such
rights.234
Thus, it was important to the Ninth Circuit to preserve the con-
sensual nature of the union, to respect the wishes of the territorial
inhabitants, and to rationalize the constitutional exemption as a prod-
uct of democracy at work. This philosophy protects democratic val-
ues, although admittedly at the expense of individual rights. Robert
Katz concluded that it "provides the inhabitants of the NMI with
more democratic space to enact communitarian policies."' 2 5 More-
231. Covenant § 105 ("In order to respect the right of self-government guaranteed by
this Covenant the United States agrees to limit the exercise of that authority so that the
fundamental provisions of this Covenant, namely Articles 1, 11 and III and Sections 501 and
805, may be modified only with the consent of the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands.").
232. See LiEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 592. In fact, the position of the MFSC was correct
in hindsight. The Commission argued that a land alienation restriction would not be suc-
cessful unless the people voluntarily agreed to and understood it. Id
233. See Herald, supra note 195, at 144-54.
234. Katz, supra note 130, at 798.
235. Id. at 803.
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over, the Ninth Circuit's test, admittedly "speculative and abstract,...
arguably imposes fewer constraints on the courts' ability to impair
rights overseas. 236 There are several problems with this general ap-
proach. First, constitutional principles are enduring, not negotiable.
Second, there are no effective limits on these exemptions.
a. Constitutional Principles Are Not Negotiable
The Ninth Circuit approaches the Covenant as a contract and
finds no limitations on the parties' ability to bargain away equal pro-
tection guarantees. The argument is that the United States should be
flexible enough to cut constitutional corners to meet the needs of indi-
vidual territories. The item under discussion, however, is not a statute
or regulation, but a constitution. It is more troublesome to claim ex-
emptions from constitutional equal protection guarantees than federal
laws or regulations. Inconvenience has never openly been used as an
excuse to ignore the Constitution. Here, the United States extended
its sovereignty and its citizenship to the NMI, not just foreign aid. In-
deed, the Covenant created a political union between the NMI and
the United States.237 As one commentator observed:
[O]nce a society, such as the Northern Marianas, freely chooses
to become a "part" of the United States, and its inhabitants
freely choose to become citizens of the United States, then the
application of the Constitution should not be the subject of ne-
gotiation. In such a situation, deviations from constitutional
standards cannot be justified under the guise of a "different cul-
tural setting merely to meet the expedient needs of the negotia-
tors of a covenant."z 8
The claim that the NMI majority wished not to be constrained by
"inappropriate" principles in the United States Constitution is irrele-
vant. One of the values of a constitution is that it enshrines certain
principles from floating majoritarian values. In fact, if United States
citizens voted on the Bill of Rights today, there might be serious ques-
tions as to its likelihood of passage. Like the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
the electorate-in the quest for an immediately desired specific re-
sult-might lose sight of the long term consequences.239 Thus, arguing
that the majority in the NMI demanded release from a provision
236. Id. at 801.
237. Covenant § 101 (NMI will exist "in political union with and under the sovereignty
of the United States of America.").
238. Branch, supra note 39, at 38-39.
239. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-7, at 10-11 (2d ed. 1988).
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designed to protect minority interests illustrates a problem and is not
a justification for the race-based land restriction.
b. Get to Yes and Then Claim You Have an International Obligation
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the United States government
may dispense with fundamental constitutional protections when mili-
tary expediency and "international obligations" so require.240 The
Ninth Circuit claimed that "[t]he Bill of Rights was not intended to
interfere with the performance of our international obligations."24
Legally, however, exactly the opposite is true. The Constitution exists
to protect these rights from infringement in both domestic and inter-
national contexts.242 Further, the Ninth Circuit's doctrine that limits
the Constitution where it is "inconvenient" is not based on any prece-
dent and is limitless in principle. What the Ninth Circuit does is en-
able agreements between the United States and territorial entities that
abridge individual constitutional rights where there is some boiler-
plate language that the "agreement would not have been possible
without the concession."' 2 3
The problems with a negotiated constitution are numerous. Territo-
ries, or rather territorial leaders and negotiators, may claim that the
small nature of their societies makes full grant of First Amendment
privileges impractical, that free speech is anomalous in a small, closely
knit society, that the majority's religious preference should be sup-
ported by the territorial government,244 that equal rights for women
would cut against the grain of the culture and values of the society,
that arrest without cause and detention without trial are acceptable in
a particular culture,2 45 and that the racial classifications, provide the
best solutions for a number of troublesome social issues.246 Balanced
240. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
241. Ld.
242. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) ("No agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution.") (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957));
Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087
(1989); In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th Cir. 1984).
243. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 ("Absent the alienation restriction, the political union
would not be possible.").
244. In the largely Catholic community of Guam, for example, there might be a desire
to exempt those aspects of the constitutional right to privacy that protect a woman's free-
dom to have an abortion. See Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada,
962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
245. Compare infra notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
246. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,501 (1989) ("The history of
racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or
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against these needs will be the United States' desire to bring the par-
ticular entity under United States sovereignty. If the territorial lead-
ers are good negotiators, or have a strong negotiating position, they
may receive many constitutional exemptions. The problem with a test
that relies upon the demands of territorial negotiators is that it will
place the entire Constitution on the table for negotiation; the only
remaining hurdle will be that all the negotiators collaborate in design-
ing the boilerplate. 7
Before Wabol, the negotiators were restrained by the potential
threat that the judiciary would invalidate their constitutional exemp-
tions. The Wabol decision, however, now gives the negotiators explicit
authority to cut and paste the United States Constitution. The Consti-
tution can now become the starting point for questionable experi-
ments. Every agreement with a territory will include appropriate
rhetoric about the need to compromise. Also, because the Ninth Cir-
cuit's test places no effective limits on the number of exemptions,
most territorial entities will try to obtain as many exemptions as
possible.24 8
In practice, the Ninth Circuit's opinion will preserve the existing
power structure in the islands. 9 Persons negotiating on behalf of the
territories are generally the elite in that society. Not surprisingly, they
may have little interest in adopting practices that may limit their
power, and therefore will probably negotiate as many exemptions to
preserve their power.250
United States negotiators may provide some protection against
demands to grant exemptions from constitutional protections to terri-
torial inhabitants. It is questionable, however, how much protection
negotiators can provide where there are few limits on what is negotia-
ble. In the NMI's case, United States negotiators' main purpose was
executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.") (citing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235-40 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
247. The practical result of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wabol is that the Constitution
applies to the NMI only to the extent that the Covenant provides. This approach was
explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Atalig. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 688.
248. In the Covenant negotiations, the drive was to place as many provisions as possible
under the "mutual consent" umbrella of Covenant § 105, to limit Congress' authority in the
NMI. See LiEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 540.
249. Representatives from Rota and Tinian were able to successfully preserve a large
chunk of power by negotiating the malapportioned legislature. Covenant § 203(c). See
also Herald, supra note 195, at 181-85.
250. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
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to secure military and national security objectives.251 The agreement
was viewed, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, as a very desirable
military objective.252 United States negotiators also face the compet-
ing concern that they will be viewed as "colonizing" the territory and
therefore will want to appear to be granting a measure of indepen-
dence or self-government. For example, the negotiators worded Cov-
enant section 805 to reflect concern for the culture of the inhabitants,
but the legislative history indicates that the federal checking account
was a concern as well.253
These conflicting concerns are at work in the Covenant.
Although voicing a commitment to preserving cultural integrity and
land ownership in the name of NMI descent persons, the United
States also negotiated a 50 year lease on two-thirds of Tinian, and a
power of eminent domain. 4 This lease reserved Tmian for future
military bases. Neither this land displacement nor the military base
are entirely compatible with the section 805 rhetoric. It is not that
such compromises among competing concerns are wrong-that is ne-
gotiation. When the negotiators may freely bargain with constitu-
tional values, however, every principle can be sacrificed. It will not be
difficult under Wabol to design the boilerplate with appropriate refer-
ence to military and national security needs. Such circumstances call
for more, not less, judicial scrutiny.
c. NMI Inhabitants as a Limiting Force
The Ninth Circuit viewed the negotiators and territorial inhabit-
ants as an important limitation on constitutional corner cutting. The
Ninth Circuit's characterization of Covenant section 805 as a "de-
mand" for release from equal protection rights is questionable, how-
251. See Hirayasu, supra note 10, at 496 ("The United States negotiated from a position
of its perceived security and defense needs in the areas. The Micronesian negotiating
teams sought to attain the highest possible level of United States funding consistent with
the greatest possible degree of political autonomy.").
252. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 ("It would also hamper the United States' ability to form
political alliances and acquire necessary military outposts.").
253. See Lsnowrrz, supra note 7, at 71 ("Congress feared that if no such restrictions
were imposed, the Marianas people might sell off their land and then turn to the federal
government for continued financial assistance.").
254. Covenant §§ 803, 806. The United States' strategic military interest in Micronesia
has influenced the negotiating process in both the NMI as well as other entities such as
Palau. Palau's refusal to amend its "nuclear free" Constitution to allow United States nu-
clear-powered vessels and to allow the United States to exercise eminent domain power,
caused a negotiating impasse for almost 15 years. See Jon Hinck, The Republic of Palau
and the United States: Self-Determination Becomes the Price of Free Association, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 915 (1990).
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ever, considering that in the negotiating history, the Marianas side did
not demand section 805 at all.255 Moreover, the vote on the Covenant
was an "up or down" one, the choice being between the already nego-
tiated Covenant and a return to a Trust Territory District.2 56 Finally,
common sense dictates that requiring approval by the majority group
that they be allowed to enforce a racial restriction against a minority
group may not be a significant barrier.
The Ninth Circuit's "demand" requirement, however, would
probably exclude a situation where the United States tried to use its
powerful position to undercut constitutional protections to the major-
ity of the inhabitants, e.g., deciding that equal protection guarantees
would be too cumbersome to apply to United States action against the
majority interests of the voting population. If the United States, for
example, proposed to apply disparate pay scales based on race and
ethnicity to its employees in a particular territory, a majority of the
voting inhabitants would not agree to this exception from equal pro-
tection constraints.
For example, when the United States administered the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands, the United States paid Micronesian em-
ployees significantly less than its United States citizen employees, and
citizens from other countries varying amounts depending upon their
country of origin." 7 If the rule adopted is simply an "impractical and
anomalous" standard, the United States could construct an argument
that payment of equal wages regardless of race or national origin was
"impractical and anomalous" due to market forces.258 If an additional
caveat on adoption of the "impractical and anomalous" standard is
255. See LIEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 592. The negotiators representing the NMI-the
Marianas Political Status Commission (MPSC)-questioned the wisdom of making the re-
striction mandatory. It was the United States that insisted on the land alienation restric-
tion. The MPSC preferred to leave the issue to the NMI people.
256. See LIEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 505, 533-34. The Covenant as a whole was what
the general population voted on-a take it or leave it deal. The Marianas Political Status
Commission was composed of leaders whose wealth and interests may have differed from
the general population. Certainly the land alienation restriction works to the advantage of
wealthy persons of NMI descent. They have a captive land market, and absolutely no
restriction placed on their acquisition of NMI land. The very manner in which the restric-
tion was designed reflects these interests.
257. Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 2 Commw. Rptr. 598, 640 (D.N.
Mar. I. 1986).
258. The Trust Territory justified the disparate wage scales by saying they were neces-
sary "to promote economic advancement and self sufficiency of the inhabitants," as man-
dated by the Trusteeship Agreement. The Trust Territory needed to recruit off island labor
and would have to pay that labor the prevailing wage rate in their country of recruitment.
The Trust Territory believed paying Micronesian employees the higher level would be "fi-
nancially disastrous and economically unsound." Id.
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that territorial inhabitants must demand release from some particular
aspect of equal protection, it is unlikely that the disparate wage scales
would be released from equal protection constraints because the vot-
ing majority would not demand lower wages for themselves.
Yet, the danger of government overreaching does not disappear
with the requirement that territorial voting residents demand release
from these individual rights-especially equal protection rights. Their
demands should not be entitled to any less suspicion. 59 The protec-
tion of individual rights demands protection against the power of gov-
ernment, the United States or a territorial government, especially on
behalf of minority voting interests or non-voting interests. Although
it would be comforting to believe that the territorial government al-
ways has the best interests of people at heart, governments consisting
of humans all too often favor the interests of their leadership and the
maintenance of their power.
Territorial governments, for example, may be just as likely to
adopt disparate pay scales based on race or national origin if non-
voters are the losers; the NMI has effectively adopted such pay scales
already.260 Its low minimum wage covers mainly nonresident workers
from Asian countries. The exemption categories from even this low
wage rate-maids and farmers and fisherman-are almost exclusively
nonresident workers with non-United States citizenship.261 If the
Covenant was negotiated today, NMI claims of preserving their differ-
259. One factual difficulty confronting this theory is that it was not the NMI that wished
the § 805 policy written into the Covenant. See LiEBowrrz, supra note 7, at 592.
260. See Hearing on H.R. 602, The "Omnibus Territories Act," Before the Subcomm. on
Native American and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Leslie Turner, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Territorial
and International Affairs) ("Virtually all local residents of the CNMI, including govern-
ment employees, are earning more than the federal minimum wage. The only purpose
served by the lower CNMI minimum is to maintain a lower wage for guest workers; in
contrast, all workers are subject to the federal minimum wage in neighboring Guam.") (on
file with author).
261. See Herald, supra note 195, at 151-52. The NMI law allows employers to work
maids and farmers up to 72 hours per week without payment of any overtime. 4 C.M.C.
§ 9223(b). These categories of workers are also exempt from the minimum wage and their
basic pay rate is $200 per month. Id. In response to a question from the United States
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs as to why housemaids (most from the
Philippines) were exempt from the NMI minimum wage, the NMI government at first pro-
posed the cavalier reply, "Maids in the Philippines are making below $25 per month."
What the Answers Answered, MARIANAS VARIETY, Sept. 18, 1992, at 4.
In response to another question whether the $2.15 per hour minimum wage in the
NMI was a living wage in the NMI, the NMI government responded "Thousands volunta-
rily work at or below this wage because it is many times the available wage in their home-
lands. To them it is a 'living wage.' It keeps them and their families alive." Answers to 61
Questions, MARIANAS VARIETY, Sept. 17, 1992, at 4.
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ing economic base and their right to govern could all be used to justify
continuing to pay the non-citizen domestic workers $200 a month, and
allowing the employers to make them work 72 hours a week without
overtime, and the votes could conceivably demand it.262
Thus, if the Wabol standard prevails, it could open the door to
United States expansionism-the extension of United States sover-
eignty-where it seems inappropriate for the United States to develop
such a close political affiliation. An example is the State of Yap in the
Federated States of Micronesia, formerly also part of the same Trust
Territory system that contained the NMI. The State of Yap maintains
a highly traditional caste system.263 Thus, although the Yap Constitu-
tion purports to provide the guarantee of equal protection, the custom
of the caste system is also a constitutional guarantee.
The framers of the Yap Constitution rejected a proposal prohibit-
ing slavery and involuntary servitude:
The Standing Committee acknowledged that "involuntary servi-
tude might exist to some degree.... Some people might believe
that low caste people are at times pressured to perform certain
tasks against their will. This might be true in some cases." The
Committee's candid recognition of the caste system and poten-
tial conflicts which might arise from a prohibition against invol-
untary servitude resulted in a clause which only prohibits
slavery.2 4
The NMI government recently settled a lawsuit that the U.S. Department of Justice
brought against it for discrimination in the employment of Filipino school teachers. See
Mariana Islands to Pay $2 Million to Filipino Teachers in Bias Accord, BNA DAILY LABOR
REPORT, August 22, 1994, available in Westlaw 1994 DLR 160 d 9.
262. Thus the NMI Special Task Force on the Minimum Wage agreed with the Saipan
Chamber of Commerce that household workers should continue to be exempt from the
minimum wage because "it allows local mothers to enter the workforce and, therefore,
provides dual-income support to households." Nick Legaspi, Task Force Presents 2 Wage
Hike Options, MARIANAS VARIETY, November 4, 1992, at 1; see also Wage Bill Means
Surrender of NMI Sovereignty, MARIANAS VARIETY, May 4, 1993 at 1.
263. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Role of Custom and Traditional Leaders Under the
Yap Constitution, 10 U. HAw. L. REv. 81, 93 n.90 (1988).
If the United States wanted a closer relationship with Yap for military purposes-
including United States citizenship and sovereignty-than that actually negotiated (free
association), the Wabol decision might justify allowing the perpetuation of the caste sys-
tem, which is incompatible with equal protection values. The Wabol requirements seem to
be that the constitutional right is incompatible with local values and the majority (the non-
untouchables) demand release from this right. Both requirements could be met in the case
of Yap's caste system.
264. See Tamanaha, supra note 263, at 93 (footnotes omitted).
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The Yapese leadership negotiated a prominent place in their con-
stitution for traditional leaders.26 5 In addition, traditional customs
also appear to be protected. For example:
[i]n a recent case, three juveniles causing a disturbance in a vil-
lage were caught by the villagers, beaten, bound to a tree, and
held until a traditional apology was tendered by the offenders'
village. Although this action was illegal under the criminal
code, no prosecution ensued because the villagers' response was
legitimate under tradition.2"
The argument is not that outside forces should break down the
Yapese caste system. Rather, the United States should not allow its
sovereignty to be extended to Yap in such a way that a stronger wall
of government protection may be built around the caste system.
United States equal protection values are incompatible with the
Yapese system. Knowing this makes close political affiliation less
likely.267 But under the Wabol analysis, United States citizenship and
sovereignty may easily be extended to all members of the Yapese
castes without all corresponding constitutional fights. The United
States may therefore guarantee perpetuation of the caste system to
protect cultural integrity, and equal protection will not be a barrier.
Finally, departures from constitutional constraints will be based
on negotiating ability and how much bargaining power the territorial
entity has, instead of any particularly defensible principle. Although
groups living in the United States may not be entitled to any protec-
tion or special deference for their culture, some United States citizens
in the territories will be entitled to it and others similarly situated in
another territory will not.
d. The Compromises-Sellable but Not Necessarily Workable
Covenant section 805 reflects the negotiating pressures on both
sides. The restriction was "sellable." The negotiators left the design
up to the NMI, because they wanted to avoid the label "colonialist"
that would attach if they designed and imposed the land alienations
restriction. It was simpler and more sellable to get an agreement on
the grand theory and then allow the NMI to work out the important
details. NMI persons, who for the most part had been accustomed to
265. Id. at 101-02. One wonders if the members of the "untouchables" caste had been
doing the negotiating, whether the same prominent protection for tradition would have
been maintained.
266. Id. at 93 n.90.
267. Yap, as part of the Federated States of Micronesia is part of an independent sover-
eign state. See Bowoon Sangsa v. Micronesian Indus. Corp., 720 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir.
1983).
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individual land ownership and the buying and selling of land for some
years, might have been unwilling to make the sacrifice of including
themselves in the restriction. Thus, a racial restriction was particularly
attractive because it blocked others from the market yet left those
with existing wealth free to buy up as much land as they wanted, and
with less competition. The Covenant negotiators simply chose to take
the easy route of racial preference rather than confront the complex
issues that every society faces in deciding the amount and level of ac-
ceptable economic development and change.
To the United States negotiators, the racial restriction also pro-
vided an attractive option because it allowed the negotiators to claim
that they had taken some action on a difficult issue without pushing
the NMI to adopt any specific approach; it allowed the United States
to say "we tried, you failed." To be fair, the United States was
damned either way. If it took the tough approach of forcing a land
alienation provision or other measures that might be likely to succeed,
it risked having the NMI leadership refuse to deal with the "imperial-
ist" power that was forcing the leaders to accept provisions that were
against their best interests or that would stunt economic development.
If the United States did not address the issue of land alienation, it
risked being blamed for the same problems that had occurred in other
places such as Hawaii and Guam. There is a tension, unresolved in
the Trusteeship Agreement, between preserving culture and encour-
aging economic development. The United States could be criticized
on one or the other grounds, no matter which approach it adapted.
Covenant section 805 is the perfect scapegoat for both sides. Be-
cause it blamed the problems on the "outsiders," there were no pres-
sures on the insiders to set development limits, such as standards of
local participation or zoning codes. NMI persons, under the aliena-
tion restrictions, can buy and sell among themselves. No focus is
placed on whether these insider sales might be disruptive to the cul-
ture or economically displace NMI persons. The focus is on the out-
siders and not on ensuring minimal displacement or that land
transactions are generally scrutinized for fairness.26 8 When the land
268. See, e.g., Northern Mariana Islands, Journal of the Second Constitutional Conven-
tion, 34th Day, July 21, 1985, at 747 (on file with author). The NMI's Second Constitu-
tional Convention deleted a proposed amendment that would have required appraisals of
land before persons entered into long term leases or sales because it would apply to per-
sons of NMI descent buying and selling their lands among themselves and agreements with
outsiders. The objection appeared to be that any appraisal requirement should apply to
outsiders only, not to land sales and leases generally, no matter the ethnicity of the trans-
acting parties.
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alienation restriction was designed, privately held land comprised only
ten percent of the land in the NMI.269 Restrictions on alienation of
public land based on culturally compatible purposes might have been
more effective. Zoning to control the nature and placement of devel-
opment, general regulation of development, and immigration limits
could also have furthered the cause.2 70 The classification used was
neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the goal of protecting cul-
ture and traditions. There existed a number of non-racial alternatives.
These restrictions-applicable to all races and ethnic groups-would
have protected civil rights, family structures, and culture.
V. Adopting a Policy That Addresses Real Problems With
Solutions That Are Constitutional
If the land alienation restriction was designed to achieve the goals
set out in Covenant section 805, it has failed. There is no reason to cut
constitutional corners-as the court in Wabol did-to protect the end
result. Indeed, it is wrong to continue the charade because it delays
taking appropriate steps to achieve the real objectives.
The land alienation restriction and the Wabol decision can be
viewed as symbolic gestures. They demonstrate that the United States
will only impose its Constitution as far as the inhabitants of a territory
wish to have it imposed upon them. Or as one commentator has ar-
gued, the Wabol decision helps, "to maximize the legitimacy of the
United States' authority in each particular territory."271 United States
expansion is by contract, not conquest. It makes territorial expansion
easy, but it also makes it less legitimate because it gives territorial
inhabitants less constitutional protection than they had even under the
Insular Cases. It reduces the United States Constitution to the status
of a franchise agreement, and it justifies, in part, these results as re-
quired by United States military needs.
There are a number of tensions inherent in the relationship be-
tween the United States and its territories. A few specific differences
between the states and territories that have caused concern about un-
equal treatment are: (1) the right of self-government; (2) the right to
vote for president; (3) the guarantee of an Article III court; (4) the
right to representation in Congress; and (5) guarantees of the applica-
269. Willens and Siemer, supra note 2, at 1407.
270. See Herald, supra note 195, at 174-80. Recently the Saipan legislative delegation
acted to suspend zoning controls for another three years. See Saipan Solons Agree to Sus-
pend Zoning, MARIANAS VARmTY, July 8, 1994, at 1.
271. Katz, supra note 130, at 780.
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tion of other constitutional provisions, including individual rights.272
The Wabol decision does not solve any of the first four issues and
exacerbates the fifth.
In practical terms, the NMI has a right of local self-government,
both guaranteed in the Covenant, and at least the practical equivalent
of that left to the fifty states.2 73 In searching for alleged interferences
with its right of self government, the NMI has not come up with an
emotionally or judicially strong example of congressional interference
with its right of self-government. 274 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
inserted a protective barrier by recently holding that whenever Con-
gress acts pursuant to its Covenant powers to pass legislation affecting
the NMI, the federal interest is balanced against the degree of intru-
sion in the Commonwealth's internal affairs.2 7
Of course the states have the explicit protection of the Tenth
Amendment. But it-at present-is much more theoretical than real
protection. If the only difference between federal authority over the
states and the territories lies with the Tenth Amendment, the whole
debate would seem to be a tug of war over the Emperor's new clothes.
The Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
provides little protection against the overwhelming authority of the
Congress under the Commerce Clause.276 Indeed, the Supreme
Court, until recently, referred everyone to their senators and repre-
sentatives for redress of claims of overreaching against their federal
government.277
Second, the right to vote for the President is a right of state citi-
zenship and therefore a right denied citizens residing in territories.278
272. See Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 469-71; Lawson, supra note 28, at 877-79;
Lmsowrrz, supra note 7, at 114, 120; Attorney General of Guam v. United States, 738
F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984) (residents of territories have no constitutional right to vote
for the president), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389 (1973) (requirement of Article III court inapplicable to territories); TORR UELLA, supra
note 6.
273. Covenant § 103 ("The people of the Northern Mariana Islands will have the right
of local self-government and will govern themselves with respect to internal affairs in ac-
cordance with a Constitution of their own adoption.").
274. See Hillblom v. United States, 896 F.2d 426,431 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing and
rejecting claims that three federal laws applicable to the NMI violated the NMI's right of
self-government).
275. United States v. Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1993).
276. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). But see United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down federal law as beyond the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause power).
277. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
278. Attorney Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984)
("The right to vote in presidential elections under Article III inheres not in citizens but in
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Nothing short of a constitutional amendment will solve this problem.
Third, the Supreme Court has held Article III inapplicable to the ter-
ritories and citizens there must content themselves with Article IV
territorial courts, staffed by federal judges with limited tenure. Others
have made strong arguments that this arrangement is a mistake. 79
The Supreme Court could rectify that problem, or it could be done by
constitutional amendment.
A fourth problem is the lack of representation in the Congress.
The territories do not have representatives in the Senate. The NMI
has no representation in the House of Representatives. The Congress
may pass legislation applicable to them without their legislative partic-
ipation. This lack of a right of participation in the federal government
has been softened in some ways in the Covenant between the NMI
and the United States. The NMI may request a non-voting delegate in
the House of Representatives and other territories have non-voting
delegates.280 This arrangement is far short of the representation a
state enjoys. On the other hand, the NMI population falls far short of
that of a state, and changes in representation might not have popular
support. 11 The taxes collected in the NMI remain with the NMI gov-
ernment easing the problem of federal taxation without representa-
tion.m8 Also, the Covenant specifically provides that the NMI and
United States "will consult regularly on all matters affecting the rela-
tionship between them."' 83
Finally, the Insular Cases generally insure that not all constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Revenue Clause or jury trial guaran-
tees2 4 automatically apply in the territories. The most important
constitutional safeguard available to residents of the states is the pro-
tection of individual rights from government action. This is the differ-
ence the Wabol court addresses and it exacerbates the problems
originally caused by the Insular Cases. Allowing territorial and
states; citizens vote indirectly for the President by voting for state electors."), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1209 (1985). The Covenant provided for United States citizenship for most NMI
residents when the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated. Covenant §§ 301-303.
279. See supra note 102.
280. A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives making that request. See
H.R. 4927, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
281. Even the slight shift in power that accompanied the largely symbolic grant to terri-
torial delegates of voting privileges in the House of Representatives' Committee of the
Whole triggered a legal challenge, though it was unsuccessful. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d
623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
282. Covenant § 601.
283. Covenant § 902.
284. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,287 (1901) (Revenue Clause); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (jury trial).
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United States negotiators to exclude these provisions with the limited
check on their actions evidenced in the Wabol case-if they say it is
impractical and anomalous, then it must be so-removes a significant
check on government authority that operates in favor of the inhabit-
ants of the territory. If indeed the inhabitants, however defined,
wished to give up specific protection, it is a questionable solution to
the legitimacy of United States authority in the territories. It allows a
majority to remove constitutional protections specifically designed to
protect individual rights. It makes the United States presence less le-
gitimate by making expansion easier at the expense of protection of
individual rights.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit tried to be sensitive to the territories' "separate
and unequal" status."85 Unfortunately, it ignored precedent and es-
tablished the principle that there were potentially no individual consti-
tutional rights of territorial residents that could not be negotiated
away. In the Wabol case, the Ninth Circuit left open the possibility
that equal protection of the laws may apply of its own force in some
vague manner in the territories. It may protect some activities that are
"fundamental in the international sense." 286 If owning property, how-
ever, does not fit into this category, it is difficult to imagine what
does. Most daily activities will also fall outside the scope of coverage,
and thus within the negotiators' domain. Racial (and arguably gender)
discrimination are negotiable issues.
Moreover, there is no principled basis for distinguishing equal
protection from other individual rights protected under the Constitu-
tion, such as the First or Fourth Amendments. These Amendments
will not block an agreement with the territories that limits these rights,
as long as the negotiators cut the deal with the appropriate boilerplate
language and the agreement receives majority approval. This is insuf-
ficient protection for individual rights. Negotiators have agendas that
often conflict with the protection of individual rights. Requiring ma-
jority approval in the territory of the ultimate agreement may not pro-
vide sufficient protection for individual rights. Limiting the rights of
unpopular or disenfranchised minorities could have popular support.
The Ninth Circuit's decision ratified failed policy with contrived
law. The Ninth Circuit's sympathy with the goals of the racial land
285. TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 5.
286. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460.
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alienation restriction drove it down the tortured path it took. When
the restriction and the NMI's situation are examined in any depth,
however, it becomes clear that the racial part of the restriction was
irrelevant to achieving the goals. The restriction takes a complex
problem, dealing with economic development and cultural change,
and boils it down to race. Race has not been part of the solution, but
a disturbing distraction from the real problem. Everything the negoti-
ators feared would happen with unrestricted development and more,
nevertheless occurred with that restriction in place. The potential for
even greater policy failures in United States territorial relations looms
because the Wabol decision encourages the same approach in future
agreements.
There are problems when comparing the position of the states
and the territories. Territorial residents do not have the same rights of
participation in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the
federal government. They have been excluded from some of the
checks and balances of that system. But to remedy that problem by
allowing negotiators to eliminate constitutional guarantees protecting
individual rights is a giant step in the wrong direction.
The United States and the NMI faced some hard choices about
the direction of their relationship and the future of the NMI when
they negotiated the Covenant. Unfortunately, the NMI has not fol-
lowed the path of balanced development, as envisioned in the Cove-
nant. The land alienation restriction remains legally intact. Given the
current conditions in the NMI, the practical result is that the restric-
tion is a stark symbol of a failed policy. It is disheartening that the
Covenant framers used a racial decoy to address important social con-
cerns. It is, however, more distressing that the Ninth Circuit stamped
its judicial approval on the Covenant, encouraging further agreements
with the territories that limit individual constitutional rights.
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